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PREFACE
Kelley Mitchell, a 75-year-old woman, lives alone in Terrell Park, an affluent
neighborhood in a major city in the Midwest. One day while rushing to the
telephone, she slips and falls down the stairs and is immediately raced to the
hospital in her neighborhood. Diagnosed with a hip fracture, she has surgery and
recuperates in the hospital for several weeks. Her condition improves, but she
cannot take care of herself, so the hospital discharge staff plans to transfer her to a
nursing home on November 4, 2008. On the same day that Kelley is rushed to the
hospital, her friend Blanche Manning, a 75-year-old woman living alone, trips and
fractures her hip. Blanche also resides in Terrell Park and is immediately raced to
the same hospital as Kelley. Blanche is diagnosed with a hip fracture and
recuperates from the surgery for several weeks. Unable to care for herself, Blanche
is told by the hospital discharge staff that she will be transferred to a nursing home
on November 4, 2008.
Seeking to transfer Kelley, the hospital discharge staff contacts the sole
nursing home in Terrell Park, giving Kelley's information and requesting a transfer.
The request is rejected because all their Medicaid certified beds are filled. Half an
hour later the same discharge staff member contacts the same nursing home on
behalf of Blanche, giving her information and requesting a transfer. The nursing
home is still out of Medicaid certified beds; however, it accepts Blanche and
certifies an additional bed as Medicaid. Blanche is immediately transferred to this
high-quality nursing home, while Kelley is transferred to a poor quality nursing
home located in an unsafe neighborhood fifty miles from her home. Blanche's
nursing home is like a resort, while Kelley's nursing home is atrocious. For
example, Kelley is not receiving physical therapy or adequate pain medication.
Consequently, Kelley is unable to walk on her own and is in constant pain.
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Blanche, however, is in physical therapy, receiving the correct amount of pain
medication, and can walk without assistance. Last week both nursing homes were
surveyed for compliance with the Medicaid Act's' quality of care regulations.2
Blanche's nursing home did not have any violations, whereas Kelley's nursing
home had several violations including failure to provide adequate pain
management3 and services to attain the highest practicable physical well-being of
each resident.4
Even though their payment status, physical condition, neighborhood of
residency, and educational level were the same, Kelley and Blanche were placed in
significantly different nursing homes. The only difference is their race. Kelley is
African American, and Blanche is Caucasian. Although this story is fictional,5
empirical data6 and case law7 show that the story of these two women is a common
occurrence, not an isolated incident, and is most likely caused by racial
discrimination.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
2. 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2009).
3. See id. §§ 483.25(e), (in), .60 (requiring facilities to provide patients with adequate care to
improve range of motion, reduce medication errors, and prescribe appropriate drugs); Ctrs. for Medicare
& Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., State Operations Manual app. PP (2009),
available at http://cms.hhs.gov/manuals/Downloads/soml07ap-pp-guidelinesitcf.pdf (providing
guidance on pain management).
4. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 ("Each resident must receive and the facility must provide the necessary
care and services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychological well-
being .... ).
5. This story is based in part on actual events of racial discrimination in nursing home admission
practices. See Taylor v. White, 132 F.R.D. 636, 639-40, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (challenging the delay in
transfer to nursing homes and the poor quality of care provided to African Americans in Philadelphia
nursing homes); Linton ex rel. Arnold v. Comm'r of Health & Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925, 927 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (challenging racial discrimination committed by the state of Tennessee through its policy of
limiting the number of Medicaid beds in nursing homes); Brief of Plaintiff at 1, 3-6, United States v.
Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (No. 5:97-CV-00295) (arguing that a nursing
home violated the Fair Housing Act based on evidence of racial discrimination).
6. Several research studies show that even when payment status is controlled there are still
significant inequities in access and quality of nursing home care that are only explained based on a
difference in the patient's race. David Falcone & Robert Broyles, Access to Long-Term Care: Race as a
Barrier, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 583, 588-91 (1994); Mary L. Fennell et al., Facility Effects on
Racial Differences in Nursing Home Quality of Care, 15 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 174, 174-76 (2000);
David Barton Smith, The Racial Integration of Health Facilities, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 851,
862-64, 866 (1993); William G. Weissert & Cynthia Matthews Cready, Determinants of Hospital-to-
Nursing Home Placement Delays: A Pilot Study, 23 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 619, 632, 642 (1988).
7. See cases cited supra note 5.
8. Researchers and jurists have offered innumerable neutral reasons, including residential
segregation and socioeconomic status, for racial disparities. David Barton Smith et al., Separate and
Unequal: Racial Segregation and Disparities in Quality Across U.S. Nursing Homes, 26 HEALTH AFF.
1448, 1456 (2007); Steven P. Wallace et al., The Persistence of Race and Ethnicity in the Use of Long-
Term Care, 53B J. GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SC. S104, S104-06 (1998). However, some
scholars question the neutrality of residential segregation and socioeconomic status. Jacqueline L. Angel
& Ronald J. Angel, Commentary, Minority Group Status and Healthful Aging: Social Structure Still
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INTRODUCTION
Instances of racial discrimination in health care continue despite the
enactment of civil rights laws, 9 such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Matters, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1152, 1154 (2006); Steven P. Wallace, The Political Economy of
Health Care for Elderly Blacks, 20 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 665, 674 (1990); David R. Williams,
Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects of Racism and Discrimination, 896
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 173, 177-80 (1999); David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins, Racial
Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP.
404, 405-07 (2001). Their research shows that residential segregation and socioeconomic status are
inextricably linked to the continuation of racial discrimination. Wallace, supra at 674; Williams, supra
at 177-78; Williams & Collins, supra at 407. In fact, Steven Wallace and David Williams believe that
the cause of geographic, racial segregation and socioeconomic status is linked to racial discrimination.
See Wallace, supra at 673-78; Williams & Collins, supra at 405. Furthermore, recently released nursing
home data on race suggests that, although residential segregation is a significant factor in racial
inequities in nursing home care, this residential segregation is caused by racial discrimination such as
redlining neighborhoods and denying admission to African Americans. Smith et al., supra at 1456. Thus,
even neutral reasons are not separate from racial discrimination. See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Striving for
Equality, but Settling for the Status Quo in Health Care: Is Title VI More Illusory Than Real?, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 429, 462-70 (2007) (discussing how racial discrimination plays a part in geographical
racial segregation and socioeconomic status).
9. Several articles note the continuation of racial discrimination in health care. See Thomas E.
Perez, The Civil Rights Dimension of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Status, in INST. OF MED.,
UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 626, 628,
633, 636-37 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds. 2003) (discussing how racial discrimination is subtle yet
ongoing); Neil S. Calman, Out of the Shadow: A White Inner-City Doctor Wrestles with Racial
Prejudice, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 170, 172-74 (explaining how racial prejudices affect and
limit patients' health care opportunities); Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on
Physicians' Recommendations for Cardiac Catherization, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 618, 618, 623-24
(1999) (discussing how race and sex influence physician recommendations in the treatment of
cardiovascular disease). Furthermore, there have been several lawsuits that provided extensive empirical
data suggesting the continuation of racial discrimination, particularly in nursing homes. See cases cited
supra note 5. For additional discussion of the continuation of racial discrimination in health care, see
Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight from Minority Communities: How Our Existing Civil Rights
Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1023, 1028-44,
1056-88 (2005) (discussing how hospital closures in poor minority communities demonstrate persistent
racial discrimination in health care and how the current legal structure has not prevented such
discrimination); Lisa C. Ikemoto, In the Shadow of Race: Women of Color in Health Disparities Policy,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023, 1046-52 (2006) (discussing how the current analysis of racial disparities
in health care fails to take into account gender disparities as well, thus continuing a pattern of
discrimination against women of color); Dayna Bowen Matthew, A New Strategy to Combat Racial
Inequality in American Health Care Delivery, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 793, 796, 798-821 (2005)
(discussing how, despite its success in de-segregating hospitals, Title VI has largely been ineffective in
preventing race-based discrimination with respect to quality of care); Kevin Outterson, The End of
Reparations Talk: Reparations in an Obama World, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 935,946-48 (2009) (discussing
how President Obama's focus on health reform, and not reparations, might be successful in reducing
racial disparities in access to health care); Vemellia R. Randall, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in
Health Care: A Call for State Health Care Anti-Discrimination Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1,
8-24 (2006) (discussing how Title VI has not prevented racial discrimination because the Supreme
Court has ruled that it only includes intentional discrimination, and arguing that new federal and state
anti-discrimination laws must be enacted that address unintentional discrimination and private
institutions); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Does Twenty-Five Years Make a Difference in "Unequal Treatment"?:
The Persistence of Racial Disparities in Health Care Then and Now, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 57, 57-61
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(Title VI).' Title VI prohibited racial discrimination by health care entities
receiving government funding such as Medicaid payments." The federal
government focused its initial efforts on hospitals. 12 Because hospitals relied on
federal funding, the federal government was able to force hospitals to integrate
without much resistance from the hospital industry.' 3 However, since this
accomplishment the government has relied too heavily on assurances of
compliance from other health care entities, such as nursing homes, with minimal
follow up.' 4 Thus, it comes as no surprise that research studies suggest that racial
discrimination persists in the provision of health care, particularly nursing home
care.
Research studies discussed in Part I suggest that elderly African Americans
disproportionately reside in poor quality nursing homes compared to Caucasians as
a result of racially discriminatory practices. 15 For example, research shows that,
even when other factors such as residential segregation and socioeconomic status
are controlled, significant racial inequities in access to quality nursing home care
still exist.' 6 Moreover, empirical data from several states, including New York,
North Carolina, and Illinois, show that race remains the greatest predictor of the
provision of poor quality nursing home care.' 7 These studies suggest that racial
(2010) (discussing how current federal programs aimed at elimination of racial discrimination in health
care have been successful, and calling "scholars, researchers, and federal officials to adopt a new
approach to eradicate racial disparities"); Ruqaiijah Yearby, African Americans Can't Win, Break Even,
or Get Out of the System: The Persistence of Racial Disparities in Health Care in "Post-Racial"
America, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006).
11. Id. §§ 2000d to 2000d-l. Medicaid is a state and federally funded program to pay for medical
assistance for the poor. See id. § 1396. The states administer this program. Id.
12. DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 246 (1999).
13. See id. at 247 tbl.7.1, 248 (indicating that hospitals faced little financial risk, and expanded their
markets, by embracing Medicaid).
14. Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights Litigation to Address
Race Discrimination and Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 28 (2001)
(citing Michael Meltsner, Equality and Health, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 22, 30-38 (1966)).
15. See infra Part I.
16. Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588-92; Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 174-76; Weissert &
Cready, supra note 6, at 632, 642.
17. See, e.g., Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 584, 588-91 (discussing a North Carolina study
that race is consistently a factor in discharge delay when all other factors are controlled); Fennell et al.,
supra note 6, at 174-75 (reviewing empirical studies that show that minorities do not receive
comparable quality of care in nursing homes); Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, Disparate Nursing Home Care,
CHi. REP., May 27, 2009, available at http://www.chicagoreporter.com/index.php/c/Web_Exclusive/d/
DisparateNursing-HomeCare (discussing a study conducted by Chicago Reporter of twenty-one
nursing homes in the Chicago area that found lower quality care in predominantly African American
nursing homes even when poverty is controlled for).
2010)
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discrimination, in the form of both disparate treatment and disparate impact,' 8 is the
cause. 19
The continuation of racial discrimination in nursing home care is significant
because a large part of the United States population will be over the age of sixty-
five within twenty years. By 2030, it is projected that approximately 70 million
Americans will be over the age of sixty-five years old-about twenty percent of the
18. Unlike in other industries such as education, in health care the distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination has not been clear. See Conforming Amendments to the
Regulations Governing Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race, Color, National Origin, Disability, Sex,
and Age Under the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,050, 68,050-51 (Nov. 13,
2000) (codified in 34 C.F.R. pts. 100, 104, 106, and 110) (discussing "different treatment" and
"disparate impact"); David Barton Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil Rights
Monitoring and Report Cards, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 90-91 (1998) (noting a lack of clarity
regarding these terms). Many medical journal articles, law review articles, and government reports
acknowledge the fact that there is substantial evidence of racial discrimination in the delivery of health
care without specifically characterizing what constitutes disparate treatment versus what constitutes
disparate impact. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE:
ACKNOWLEDGING DISPARITY, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION, AND ENSURING EQUALITY: VOLUME I
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES, at ix (1999)
[hereinafter HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE] (discussing both disparate treatment and disparate impact
discrimination in health care industry); Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588-92 (discussing racial
discrimination as the main reason for unequal treatment without distinguishing between disparate
treatment and disparate impact); Vernellia R. Randall, Racial Discrimination in Health Care in the
United States as a Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 47-65 (2002) (making a distinction between
discriminatory practices and disparate impact). In fact, in the 1999 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
Report on The Health Care Challenge, the Commission stated that the distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact racial discrimination was "a matter of splitting hairs. The effect is the
same: discrimination." HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra, at ix. As noted by Professors Sara
Rosenbaum and Joel Teitelbaum, "[tihere is no system for measuring the presence of discrimination"
and HHS staff have "no clear policy guidance on how to conduct disparate impact analyses, and [are]
generally unable to identify a 'nexus' between existing disparities and a health care practice or policy."
Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System:
Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 215, 231-33 (2003). Because most of the government agency reports,
empirical research studies, and law review articles cited in this Article fail to distinguish between
disparate treatment versus disparate impact discrimination in health care, I have chosen not to make a
distinction. Thus, when referring to racial discrimination I am referring to all forms of racial
discrimination, unless otherwise noted. The failure to make a distinction between disparate treatment
versus disparate impact causes numerous problems, such as isolating health care from other areas of
civil rights, making health care case precedents inapposite, and erecting insurmountable barriers to attain
proof of disparate treatment to support private lawsuits. See Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of
Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31
UCLA L. REV. 305, 306-10 (1983) (explaining how administrative agencies have set specific policies
for disparate impact as well as disparate treatment under Title VII); Daniel K. Hampton, Note, Title V1
Challenges by Private Parties to the Location of Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and Effective
Action, 37 B.C. L. REV. 517, 517-18, 536-42 (1996) (discussing how minorities have difficulty proving
intentional discrimination requiring separate disparate impact, and discussing how health care related
cases deal with the validity of a disparate impact claim in relation to a disparate treatment claim).
19. Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591-92; Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 174-76;
Lowenstein, supra note 17.
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population.2 0 This increase in the elderly population is due to the aging of baby
boomers (those born in the post World War II period from 1946 to 1964), who will
be sixty-five years or older by 2029.21 Thus, it is projected that the use of long-term
care services, 22 such as nursing homes, will increase from 8 million Americans in
2000 to 19 million in 2050.23 However, the use of nursing home services is not
equal.
Since 1995, the population of African Americans residing in nursing homes
has been greater than that of the Caucasian population.24 Yet, African Americans
disproportionately reside in substandard nursing homes compared to Caucasians.
2 5
Because African Americans disproportionately reside in poor quality nursing
homes and this disparity is projected to continue as the elderly population grows,
20. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. P25-1130, POPULATION
PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1995-2050, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS CONSUMER POPULATION REPORTS 1, 9 tbl.F (1996), available at
http://www.census.govlprodll/pop/p25-1130.pdf. As of 2006, there were 37 million Americans over the
age of sixty-five. FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING-RELATED STATISTICS, OLDER AMERICANS
2008: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 2 (2008), available at http://www.agingstats.gov/
agingstatsdotnct/MainSite/Data/2008_Documents/OA_2008.pdf
21. DAY, supra note 20, at 1, 7.
22. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services describes long-term care as including:
[M]edical and non-medical care to people who have a chronic illness or disability. Long-term
care helps meet health or personal needs. Most long-term care is to assist people with support
services such as activities of daily living like dressing, bathing, and using the bathroom.
Long-term care can be provided at home, in the community, in assisted living or in nursing
homes. It is important to remember that you may need long-term care at any age.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHAT IS LONG-
TERM CARE? (2007), http://www.medicare.gov/LongTermCare/static/Home.asp (last visited June 14,
2010).
23. OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. ET AL., THE FUTURE SUPPLY LONG-TERM CARE WORKERS IN RELATION TO THE AGING BABY
BOOM GENERATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/
ltcwork.pdf
24. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2008, at 392 tbl.107 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf
[hereinafter HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008]. This disparity is projected to continue. Id.
25. See N.Y. STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MINORITY
ELDERLY ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND NURSING HOMES 29-30 (1992) (presentation of Joseph N.
Kennedy, Acting Regional Manager for the Region II Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs.) [hereinafter MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS] (stating that minorities commonly reside in
worse nursing homes than Caucasians); Vincent Mor et al., Driven to Tiers: Socioeconomic and Racial
Disparities in the Quality of Nursing Home Care, 82 MILBANK Q. 227, 237-38 (2004) (reporting that
forty percent of African American nursing home residents live in "lower-tier" facilities, compared to just
nine percent of Caucasian nursing home residents); Lowenstein, supra note 17 (discussing how, of
twenty-one Chicago nursing homes studied, "[e]ach of the three predominantly [African American]
facilities received the lowest possible rating in 2009 from Nursing Home Compare, a federal database to
evaluate nursing homes that are Medicare- and Medicaid-certified" and "[I]ess than half of ... [the
sixteen] predominantly [Caucasian] facilities received that same rating").
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there is great urgency in putting an end to racial inequities in the provision of
quality nursing home care.26
Notwithstanding this emerging crisis, the government has failed to put an end
to racial discrimination by nursing homes receiving public funding. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)27 is the federal agency in charge
of enforcing Title VI compliance for health care entities.28 HHS delegated its duties
to its Office of Civil Rights (OCR); however, HHS has failed to adequately staff
and fund OCR's efforts.2 9 Consequently, OCR has fallen behind in two of its most
significant tasks: investigating private complaints and conducting mandatory
system-wide compliance reviews.30 Specifically, OCR has failed to timely
investigate and resolve complaints of racial discrimination, which has "result[ed] in
an unstated acceptance of poor or non-existent health care for minorities ... and a
perpetuation of inequality in the United States.'
In partnership with HHS, the states enforce Title VI compliance; however,
they have not done any better than HHS in putting an end to racial discrimination in
health care.32 To keep costs down, states have continued to give the very nursing
homes alleged to deny admission to African Americans, because of their race,
unfettered authority to make admission decisions.33 These governmental failures
are reviewed in detail in Part 11.
34
26. There is also a need for a critical analysis of the structural and institutional problems involving
race and class within the health care system. However, first there is a need to implement a framework to
collect the data necessary to understand the structural and institutional problems that cause racial
inequities in order to craft a solution, which will address these structural and institutional problems. See
Perez, supra note 9, at 637, 655 (discussing the need for a broader research on racial and ethnic
disparities in health care).
27. The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was renamed the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1980. See Department of Education Organization Act of 1979
§ 509(e), 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (2006).
28. 45 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2009).
29. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 219, 222-23 (1996) [hereinafter FEDERAL
TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT]; Brietta R. Clark, supra note 9, at 1057-59; Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra
note 18, at 230-31.
30. Clark, supra note 9, at 1058; Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 231. Both Congress
and HHS are responsible for granting funding to OCR. The literature tends to show that when provided
with ample funding HHS still cut back on OCR's funding. See FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra
note 29, at 223 (noting the inadequate staff and resources of HHS's Title VI enforcement program).
31. HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 9.
32. See infra Part Il.B.2.
33. HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 64; Madonna Harrington Meyer, Medicaid
Reimbursement Rates and Access to Nursing Homes: Implications for Gender, Race, and Marital Status,
23 RES. ON AGING 532, 534 (2001). The only change by nursing homes was the removal of blatant
discriminatory advertising, but subtle racial discrimination continued. See Smith, supra note 6, at 862
(noting that the only change in nursing homes from Title VI was the inclusion of nondiscriminatory
language in advertising signaling the inability to continue to discriminate through advertising).
34. See infra Part II.
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To fulfill the promise of racial equality in health care, HHS and the states
must aggressively monitor and sanction perpetrators in order to end discriminatory
practices-a significant change from their historical position of acquiescence. To
achieve this end, I argue in Part III that HHS and the states should integrate civil
rights enforcement with the nursing home enforcement system.35 This does not
require new legislation or regulation.36 Instead, using the existing nursing home
enforcement system, HHS and the states should review nursing home admission
decisions and the quality of care provided to patients for instances of racial
discrimination.37 Once instances of racial discrimination have been identified, HHS
and the states should impose fines as required by the nursing home enforcement
system and post the information in the public domain to protect and serve
consumers' needs.38
To induce the government to adopt and implement this integrated system, I
suggest in Part IV that Medicaid patients seeking admission to or residing in
nursing homes file 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suits39 against the Secretary of
HHS (Secretary) and the states alleging that their civil rights are being violated.4°
Building on the foundation of successful precedents, 41 African Americans should
argue that the Secretary and the states have failed to enforce the requirements of the
35. See infra Part I11.
36. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part III.C.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 351, 359.
39. See infra Part IV. Arguably, African Americans could file a private right of action under other
sections of the Civil Rights Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under the law) and § 1982
(property rights) to challenge the racially discriminatory practices of nursing homes. See Mahone v.
Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1034 (3d Cir. 1977) (establishing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1982), cert. denied 438 U.S. 904 (1978); see also Schneider v. Bahler, 564 F. Supp. 1449, 1455-56
(N.D. Ind. 1983) (recognizing the private right of action established under § 1982). These suits would
allow African Americans to sue private nursing homes for racial discrimination. However, claims under
§§ 1981 and 1982 would not provide systemic changes and require evidence of specific instances of
intentional racism, making these sections no different than the requirements for bringing a Title VI
claim. See, e.g., Schneider, 564 F. Supp. at 1456 (noting that § 1982 requires a showing of racial intent
or impact, as opposed to specific, intentionally racist acts).
40. Even though nursing homes are the perpetrators of the harm, Medicaid patients have no means
to directly affect a change in their behavior because courts have ruled that there is no private right of
action against nursing homes for failing to comply with the Medicaid care requirements. Prince v.
Dicker, No. 01-7805, 2002 WL 226492, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 14, 2002); Brogdon v. Nat'l Healthcare
Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330-32 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Estate of Ayres ex reL Strugnell v. Beaver, 48
F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339-40 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Nichols v. St. Luke Ctr. of Hyde Park, 800 F. Supp. 1564,
1567-68 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Therefore, Medicaid patients must use an indirect approach of suing the
Secretary and the states.
41. E.g., In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1984) (challenging the
federal regulation of nursing homes as being "facility oriented" rather than "patient oriented," and
therefore resulting in only "paper compliance"); Linton ex rel. Arnold v. Comm'r of Health & Env't,
779 F. Supp. 925, 932-33, 936 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (challenging racial discrimination committed by the
state of Tennessee through its policy of limiting the number of Medicaid beds in nursing homes, which
delayed African Americans transfer to nursing homes).
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Medicaid Act's 42 "reasonable promptness" provision and the Nursing Home
Reform Act's (NHRA) 43 requirements for the provision of care.44 Under the
Medicaid Act, the Secretary and the states are required to ensure that Medicaid
patients receive reasonably prompt medical assistance, which includes nursing
home care.45 Furthermore, the NHRA mandates that the Secretary and the states
regulate the actual care provided to residents to ensure that nursing homes "provide
services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental,
and psychosocial well-being of each resident .... , If the care does not comply
with the Medicaid Act or the NI{RA, then the Secretary and the states are required
to discipline the nursing home. At present, despite empirical data4 7 and government
42. Although Medicaid pays for the majority of nursing home care, Medicare also pays for nursing
home services. ELLEN O'BRIEN, GEORGETOWN UNIV., MEDICAID'S COVERAGE OF NURSING HOME
COSTS: ASSET SHELTER FOR THE WEALTHY OR ESSENTIAL SAFETY NET? I fig. 1 (2005), available at
http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/nursinghomecosts.pdf (noting Medicaid is by far the largest payer at over
forty-five percent, with Medicare making about twelve percent of the payments). The focus of this
Article is on Medicaid and the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) because courts have ruled that the
statutory language of these Acts provide rights-creating language necessary to sustain a § 1983 claim.
See infra Part IV.A.
43. The NHRA was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. Pub. L. No.
100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-160 to -221 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r
(2006 & West. Supp. 2009)). The NHRA required HHS to revamp the entire nursing home regulatory
framework to cure the perceived quality of care downfalls of nursing homes. See David A. Bohm,
Striving for Quality Health Care in America's Nursing Homes: Tracing the History of Nursing Homes
and Noting the Effect of Recent Federal Government Initiatives to Ensure Quality Care in the Nursing
Home Setting, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 317, 331-37 (2001). The NHRA changed the regulation of
nursing homes from a review of their capacity to provide "facility oriented" care to whether the nursing
home actually provided quality "patient oriented" care. Heckler, 747 F.2d at 590-91. Even though the
NHRA was incorporated into the Medicaid Act in several places, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, plaintiffs
still bring claims against the government based on the NHRA provisions and courts have ruled that the
NHRA grants private parties rights against the government. See Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 51-56
(1st Cir. 2003) (ruling that several portions of § 1396r, including subsection (b), provide a private right
of action under § 1983); Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 300-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that
§ 1396r(e)(7) provided a private right of action under § 1983). Thus, because some courts still treat the
NHRA as a separate regulatory law, even though the NHRA has been incorporated into the Medicaid
Act, I refer to the NHRA separately from other Medicaid requirements regarding access to nursing home
care.
44. Although these class action suits are discussed in terms of African American patients, all
Medicaid patients, regardless of race, can use the Medicaid Act to challenge governmental failures in
providing reasonably prompt access to quality health care. See infra notes 382, 398-401 and
accompanying text. I have proposed this solution for only African Americans because currently the
empirical data has primarily focused on racial inequities in care under Medicaid. See, e.g., Mor et al.,
supra note 25, at 235-38 (discussing the discrepancy among African Americans in Medicaid-
concentrated "lower-tier" facilities). If there are state-specific data available regarding the delay of
transfer, denial of admission, and disparities in quality of care provided to Medicaid patients versus
other patients, then Medicaid patients in that state could use this solution to obtain an equitable remedy.
See infra notes 385-88.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8)-(10), 1396d(a)(4) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
46. Id. § 1396r(b)(2).
47. See Susan L. Ettner, Do Elderly Medicaid Patients Experience Reduced Access to Nursing
Home Care?, 12 J. HEALTH ECON. 259, 278-79 (1993) (indicating an extended wait time for Medicaid
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reports48 showing that elderly African Americans are not provided with reasonably
prompt access to quality nursing home care as required by Medicaid and the
NHRA, neither the Secretary nor the states have disciplined guilty nursing homes.49
In addition to providing evidence of governmental failures to comply with the
dictates of Medicaid and the NIRA in the proposed legal actions, African
Americans will have to show that Medicaid and the NHRA provide a private right
of action under § 1983.50 Several circuits have already ruled that the "reasonable
promptness" provision51 and the NHRA52 provide a private right of action under 42
patients over private-placement patients); Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591 (discussing study
results that indicate that non-Caucasian patients experience longer discharge delays than Caucasian
patients, even when controlled for other factors); David J. Falcone & Robert Broyles, What Types of
Hospital Patients Wait for Alternative Placement? Findings from an Exploratory Case Study and Policy
Implications, 5 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y, Apr. 1994, at 77, 77-98 (providing interim a data report on
delayed discharge); David Falcone et al., Waiting for Placement: An Exploratory Analysis of
Determinants of Delayed Discharge of Elderly Hospital Patients, 26 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 339, 357-
58, 367 (1991) (highlighting race as a factor in delayed discharge from hospital to nursing home); Smith,
supra note 6, at 859-61 (discussing results of a study showing that Caucasians have better access to
higher quality facilities).
48. See HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 6-9, 73-74, 78-80, 203-04 (highlighting
discrepancies based on race in the prompt delivery of health care services); MINORITY ELDER ACCESS,
supra note 25, at 3-6 (noting the difficulties facing African Americans seeking access to health care in
New York State); Sylvia Drew lvie, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Health Law Program, Statement Before the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights: Minorities and Access to Health Care, in CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY 29, 32 (1980) (describing the difficulties that minorities face in accessing health care).
49. See infra Part II.
50. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (explaining requirements for showing
that there is a private right of action under § 1983). With the passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006), some scholars have questioned the viability of Medicaid
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. E.g., Jon Donenberg, Note, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement:
Maintaining State Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1503
(2008). However, others have argued that the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 did not in any way affect
this right. E.g., Harper Jean Tobin & Rochelle Bobroff, The Continuing Viability of Medicaid Rights
After the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 147, 147-48 (2009). To date no
court has ruled that the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 barred Medicaid claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. at 148.
51. See Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2007) (ruling that there was a private right of
action under § 1983 in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)
(ruling that there was a private right of action under § 1983 in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)); Sabree ex rel.
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 192-94 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d
581, 601, 603-07 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2002) (ruling
that there is a private right of action under § 1983 in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)). But see Sanders ex rel.
Rayl v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1250-51 (D. Kan. 2004) (finding
that the "reasonable promptness" provision does not provide a private right under § 1983); M.A.C. v.
Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307-08 (D. Utah 2003) (same).
52. See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 522, 525, 532 (3d Cir.
2009) (ruling that NHRA § 1396r(b) provided a private fight of action under § 1983); Joseph S. v.
Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 299-303 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that NHRA § 1396r(e)(7) provided a
private fight of action under § 1983); Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 51-56 (1st Cir. 2003) (ruling
that several sections of NHRA, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b), provide a private right of action under
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U.S.C. § 1983. Based on precedent, African Americans have a private right of
action against the Secretary and the states for violation the Medicaid Act and the
NHRA.
Overall, elderly African Americans have a strong case against the Secretary
and the states because they have a duty to provide reasonably prompt access to
quality nursing home care that they have breached and § 1983 provides African
Americans a private right of action to redress this breach. Although these lawsuits
can be costly and time consuming, they have the power to transform the broken
civil rights system by inducing the government to fix the problem of racial
discrimination in health care.
I. EMPIRICAL DATA OF RACIAL INEQUITIES DUE TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Medicaid is a joint federal and state partnership, which the states administer.
The purpose of the Medicaid Act is to grant reasonable access to those "whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services, and... rehabilitation and other services . . . . Originally drafted to
provide health care to poor children and families, Medicaid is now the largest payer
of long-term care services for the elderly. 55 Medicaid eligibility for the elderly
differs significantly by state, but once a patient qualifies for Medicaid, the state will
pay for nursing home services without any day limits. 56 Nursing home care
accounts for 16.6% of all Medicaid spending.
§ 1983). But see Sparr v. Berks County, No. CIV.A. 02-2576, 2002 WL 1608243, at *1-*3 (E.D. Pa.
July 18, 2002) (summarily finding no private right of action under NHRA § 1396r).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(l)-(2), (5) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
55. Although, in 2006, Medicaid only paid for 43.4% of nursing home care, it provided payment
for 64.8% of all nursing home residents. HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008, supra note 24, at 129;
CHARLENE HARRINGTON ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., S.F., NURSING FACILITIES, STAFFING, RESIDENTS AND
FACILITY DEFICIENCIES, 2001 THROUGH 2007, at 18 (2008), available at
http://www.pascenter.org/documents/OSCAR2007.pdf. See also O'BRIEN, supra note 42, at 1-2 (noting
that although Medicaid was originally crafted for poor Americans, it is now used to pay for the long-
term care of many middle-income and wealthy elderly); Charlene Harrington et al., Nurse Staffing
Levels and Medicaid Reimbursement Rates in Nursing Facilities, 42 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1105, 1106
(2007) ("Medicaid pays for [sixty-seven] percent of all nursing home residents in the United States
56. For a detailed discussion concerning qualifying for Medicaid, see KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, PAYING FOR NURSING HOME CARE: ASSETS TRANSFER AND
QUALIFYING FOR MEDICAID (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7452.pdf. See also
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATE VARIATION & HEALTH REFORM: A CHARTBOOK 9 (2009), available at
http://facts.kff.orglchartbooks/State / 20Variation%/o20and%/o20Health /o20Reform.pdf (showing that
eligibility for Medicaid varies by state); Sandra Tanenbaum, Medicaid and Disability: The Unlikely
Entitlement, 67 MILBANK Q. 288, 302 (1989) (indicating that if a beneficiary requires a "nursing home
level of care," then that beneficiary is not subject to any day limits).
57. CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES BY TYPE OF
SERVICE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS: CALENDER YEARS 1960-2008. Medicaid provides reimbursement for
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Nursing homes remain the central institutional provider of care for the elderly
and disabled,58 although some elderly and disabled patients now reside in other
long-term care facilities including assisted living facilities 59 and continuing care
retirement communities.60 In 2004, nursing homes provided care to 1.5 million
elderly and disabled persons, with the average length of stay being 835 days. 61 By
2050, nursing homes are projected to provide care to 6.6 million elderly and
disabled persons.62 African Americans' used nursing homes 14% more than
Caucasians' in 2000.63 This disparity in the growth of African Americans needing
nursing home care is projected to grow for several reasons.
First, between 2000 and 2030, the elderly African American population is
projected to grow by 168%, while the elderly population of Caucasians is expected
to grow 9 0 %.64 Second, many Caucasians no longer reside in nursing homes in part
because of the creation of new long-term care service providers. Studies show that
nursing home care for indigent elderly and affluent elderly and disabled patients that spend down their
resources. See O'BRIEN, supra note 42, at 1-2.
58. See WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEP'TS OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & COMMERCE, PUB. No. P23-
209, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 67 (2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf ("Over [ninety] percent of institutionalized older
people live in nursing homes .... ").
59. "Assisted living is for adults who need help with everyday tasks. They may need help with
dressing, bathing, eating, or using the bathroom, but they don't need full-time nursing care.... Assisted
living costs less than nursing home care." Admin. on Aging, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Assisted Living,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/assistedliving.html (last visited June 14, 2010).
60. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services:
Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs) provide housing, health care, and social
services. In the same community, there may be individual homes or apartments, an assisted
living facility, and a nursing home. Where you live depends on the level of care you need.
... Some CCRCs offer a 'life care contract.' This means, if you need care in the assisted
living facility or in the nursing home, then you are guaranteed to pay the same entry fee and
monthly fee as someone who lives in an individual home or apartment.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PAYING FOR
LONG TERM CARE: CONTINUING-CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES, http://www.medicare.gov/
LongTermCare/Static/ContinuingCare.asp?dest=NAV%7CPaying%7CHomeEquity%7CContinuingCar
e#TabTop (last visited June 14, 2010).
61. ADRIENNE L. JONES ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DHHS PUB. No.
PHS-2009-1738, THE NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY: 2004 OVERVIEW, 1, 4, 19 tbl.7 (2009),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/srI3_167.pdf. The 2004 survey of nursing
homes in the United States revealed that there were 16,100 nursing homes with an occupancy rate of
86.3%. Id. at 1, 14 tbl.l.
62. AM. HEALTH CARE ASS'N, FACTS AND TRENDS: THE NURSING FACILITY SOURCEBOOK 5
(2001), available at http://www.ahcancal.org/researchdata/trends.statistics/Documents/
NursingFacilitySourcebook_2001.pdf; Encyclopedia of Am. Indus., SIC 8051 Skilled Nursing Care
Facilities, http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Service/Skilled-Nursing-Care-Facilities.htm
(last visited June 14, 2010).
63. David Barton Smith et al., Racial Disparities in Access to Long-Term Care: The Illusive
Pursuit of Equity, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 861, 871 (2008).
64. Daniel L. Howard et al., Distribution of African Americans in Residential Care/Assisted Living
and Nursing Homes: More Evidence of Racial Disparity?, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1272, 1275 (2002).
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"an explosive expansion of private-pay assisted-living developments in the 1990s,
which served predominantly Caucasian and relatively affluent clientele," decreased
the number of Caucasians living in nursing homes.65 The siphoning off of
Caucasians has created an excess nursing-home capacity that nursing homes filled
with African American patients. 66 Third, even after adjusting for income
differences, the burden of disability falls heaviest on elderly minorities.67
Born and raised during the Jim Crow era of legalized racial discrimination,
elderly African Americans have lacked equal access to health care services for most
68
of their lives, and thus are more disabled than Caucasians. Hence, the growth in
the elderly African American population will mean more African Americans need
access to nursing home services. 69 However, two decades of empirical studies
suggest that there is a well-developed pattern and practice of racial inequities in the
provision of quality nursing home care.7 ° Specifically, African Americans receive
unequal access to quality nursing home services as a result of transfer delays from
hospitals,7 admission to poor quality nursing homes,7 2 and racial inequities in the
provision of quality nursing home care.
73
A. Delay ofAccess to Nursing Home Services in a Reasonably Prompt Manner
Scholars have defined access to health care "as those dimensions [that]
describe the potential and actual entry of a given population group to the health
65. Smith et al., supra note 63, at 876.
66. Id.
67. See Steven P. Wallace et al., The Consequences of Color-Blind Health Policy for Older Racial
and Ethnic Minorities, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 329, 335 (1998). "For example, 59 percent of elderly
blacks with incomes less than 55 percent of poverty suffer limitations of activity, compared to 51.1
percent for whites with the same income level ...." Sylvia Drew Ivie, Ending Discrimination in Health
Care: A Dream Deferred, in CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, supra note 48, at 282,
292.
68. See generally Andrea Patterson, Germs and Jim Crow: The Impact of Microbiology on Public
Health Policies in Progressive Era American South, 42 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 529, 529-59 (2009)
(discussing how the denial of access to health care as a consequence of the Jim Crow laws caused blacks
to have more health problems ranging from the acquisition of germs to life and death situations); Robert
A. Hummer et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health and Mortality Among the U.S. Elderly
Population, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN HEALTH IN LATE LIFE
53, 64-69 (Norman B. Anderson et al. eds. 2004) (stating that African Americans and Native Americans
"exhibit the highest levels of disability at each age group among the elderly").
69. See Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 175 (noting the projected growth of elderly non-Caucasions
and African Americans' lack of access to nursing home care); Wallace, supra note 8, at 673-76 (noting
a persistent difference between the proportion of older African Americans and Caucasions who use
nursing homes).
70. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588-92 (noting racial disparities in discharge delay);
Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 632, 642 (noting discrepant treatment between races in nursing
home admissions).
71. Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591-92; Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 632, 642.
72. Smith et al., supra note 63, at 871; Lowenstein, supra note 17.
73. Mor et al., supra note 25; Lowenstein, supra note 17.
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care delivery system. 7 4 Inequity in access occurs when "services are distributed on
the basis of demographic variables such as one's race, level of income, or where
one lives" instead of being distributed based on medical need.75 In turn, such
inequities in access to "health care manifests itself in many ways, affecting both the
quality and longevity of life."
7 6
More specifically, the significant manifestations of inequities in access to
nursing homes are transfer delays from hospitals. 77 Nearly half of elderly patients
are transferred to a nursing home after a hospital stay.78 The decision to transfer a
patient from a hospital to a nursing home is controlled by the patient's physician
and the hospital's discharge staff.79 A transfer normally occurs once a physician
determines that a patient is well-enough to be released from the hospital, but not
well-enough to go home. A member of the hospital discharge staff seeking to
transfer a patient contacts the nursing home. °
A delay in transfer is "the time elapsed between when a patient was medically
ready for discharge" to another form of care "and when he or she actually was
discharged."8' Delays in transfers to nursing homes have a direct impact on the
patient's well-being by denying patient's access to medically necessary
rehabilitative care, which hospitals are not equipped to provide.8 2 Non-Caucasians
are often delayed in transfer to quality nursing homes.8 3
Since the 1980s, studies have shown that African Americans are delayed by at
least ten days in a transfer from the hospital to a nursing home. 4 Statistical analysis
74. Lu Ann Aday, Sr. Res. Assoc., Ctr. for Health Admin. Studies, Univ. of Chi., Statement Before
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Selected Aspects of a National Study of Access to Medical Care,
in CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, supra note 48, at 19, 20.
75. Id.
76. HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 3.
77. Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591-92 (noting racial disparities in discharge delay);
Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 632, 642 (noting race-based discrepancies in transfer delays).
78. National statistics show "[a]bout 32 percent entered from a private residence, 45 percent were
admitted from a hospital, and about 12 percent were admitted from another nursing home." HE ET AL.,
supra note 58, at 68.
79. See MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at 18-19 (discussing the use of "discharge
planners" in hospitals who steer patients to nursing homes).
80. See Collaboration Between Nursing Homes and Health System: Hospital to Nursing Home
Issues, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/487323-3 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (discussing
telephone communication as a means facilitating the transition process).
81. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 584.
82. See id. at 592-93 (noting discharge delays have consequences for quality by providing sub-
optimal situations for frail elderly).
83. MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at 19; Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588-92;
Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 645.
84. E.g., Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 585, 589 tbl.3 (reporting an average delay of 10.7
days for the general population, eight days for Caucasians, and twenty days for non-Caucasians); see
also Etmer, supra note 47, at 260, 278 (noting that patients who rely primarily on Medicaid wait longer
for a nursing home placement, impeding the care of certain subgroups of the population).
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of transfer data suggests that African Americans' failure to find prompt nursing
home placements did not correlate with the patient's payment source, physical
condition, demographic attributes, family cooperativeness, or behavioral issues.85
Instead, race was the central factor in the timing of transfer of patients from the
hospital to a nursing home.86 Thus, scholars have attributed the delay in transfer to
racial discrimination.
87
According to the authors of the study, Professors David Falcone and Robert
Broyles, the fact that race is the greatest predictor of delay in transfer and that there
has been no change in this delay even once brought to the attention of those
responsible for transfers proves that racial discrimination is the cause of the
delays.88 Further research shows that because there are fewer African Americans in
nursing homes than Caucasians, 89 African American patients are delayed transfer to
nursing homes until they can be placed in the same room with other African
Americans or can be transferred to predominantly African American nursing
homes.90 Hence, racial discrimination is also present in the admission practices and
policies of nursing homes.
B. Denial ofAdmission to Quality Nursing Homes
Empirical studies conducted in New York and North Carolina suggest that
African Americans experience delays in transfer to quality nursing homes because
they are denied admission to quality nursing homes based on their race.9' The racial
inequities in nursing home admissions practices are significant because where a
patient is admitted usually determines the quality of care that patient receives.92
85. Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591 (asserting race-based reasons for the discrepancy).
86. See id. at 584, 591-92 (asserting that, with all other factors removed, racial discrimination must
be the cause of delay).
87. E.g., id.
88. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591-93 ("By default ... the only explanation for the
longer delays of [non-Caucasians] is the preference of nursing home owners or operators for [Caucasian]
patients (that is, discrimination).").
89. Wallace, supra note 8, at 676-77.
90. Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 632, 642.
91. See MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at 49 ("[Based on] two factfinding meetings
... and information gathered through additional research, . . . it [is] reasonable to suspect that in New
York State, discrimination on the basis of race plays a role in the rejection of at least some minorities by
the nursing homes to which they apply for long-term care."); Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 584,
588-92 (discussing delays in transfer in North Carolina nursing homes); Ronald Sullivan, New Rules
Sought on Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1985, at 146 [hereinafter Sullivan, New Rules Sought]
(discussing a recommendation to require nursing homes to keep a record of accepted and rejected
patients in order to determine whether segregation is deliberate); Ronald Sullivan, Study Charges Bias in
Admission to Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1984, at 127 [hereinafter Sullivan, Study Charges
Bias] (explaining that in New York, racial minority groups tend to be excluded from more desirable
nursing homes).
92. See David C. Grabowski, The Admission of Blacks to High-Deficiency Nursing Homes, 42
MED. CARE 456, 456-60 (2004) (explaining the results of a study showing that on average, racial
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In 1984, a study of New York nursing homes showed that nursing homes,
which provided excellent quality of care demonstrated a pattern of admitting
Caucasians over African Americans.93 The study was based on civil rights
documents submitted by nursing homes to the New York State Health
Department.94 According to the report Caucasian patients were admitted to quality
nursing homes and those in racial minority groups were relegated to substandard95
quality nursing homes.96 Similar to the real estate industry, this inequity was
attributed to "a combination of discrimination by nursing homes and steering by
hospital discharge planners. 97
minorities are admitted to nursing homes with more quality-of-care deficiency citations compared to
Caucasians).
93. Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note 91; see also Sullivan, New Rules Sought, supra note
91 (noting that a member of a New York State task force explained that "[t]here is evidence of
segregation in New York nursing homes").
94. Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note 91.
95. Substandard quality of care means that the facility has one or more deficiencies related to the
Medicaid regulations regarding resident behavior and facility practices, quality of life, or quality of care
that constitutes "immediate jeopardy to resident health or safety; a pattern of or widespread actual harm
that is not immediate jeopardy; or a widespread potential for more than minimal harm, but less than
immediate jeopardy, with no actual harm." See 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2009).
96. Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note 91; see also Wallace, supra note 8, at 677 (describing
a study showing "a clear pattern of racial discrimination by the more desirable nursing homes in [New
York City]"); Sullivan, New Rules Sought, supra note 91 (describing evidence of segregation in New
York nursing homes).
97. Wallace, supra note 8, at 677. This practice of steering is common in the real estate industry.
See generally CHARLES S. AIKEN, THE COTTON PLANTATION SOUTH SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 320-27
(1998) (discussing post-civil war federal financing of housing and the concentration of black residents
on the fringes of municipalities); STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG AS THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT
DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 6 (2000) ("Realtors...
convinced [Caucasian] home owners that property values would decline if African Americans moved in
next door."); ANDREW WIESE, PLACES OF THEIR OWN: AFRICAN AMERICAN SUBURBANIZATION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 207-08, 257 (2004) (discussing the separate suburbanization of African
American communities and Caucasian communities and the development of subdivisions designed for
African American families); Michael B. de Leeuw et al., The Current State of Residential Segregation
and Housing Discrimination: The United States' Obligations Under the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 337, 369-71 (2008)
(describing the practice of real estate steering and tests that show its prevalence); George Galster & Erin
Godfrey, By Words and Deeds: Racial Steering by Real Estate Agents in the U.S. in 2000, 71 J. AM.
PLANNING ASS'N 251, 251-54 (2005) (discussing the historically common practice of steering and the
types, mechanisms, and scale of the practice); john a. powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the
Future: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 612-13 (2008) (describing how the process of
real estate steering may occur and that its occurrence appears to have increased recently). The Supreme
Court has defined racial steering in the real estate industry as:
[A] practice by which real estate brokers and agents preserve and encourage patterns of racial
segregation ... by steering members of racial and ethnic groups to buildings occupied
primarily by members of such racial and ethnic groups and away from buildings and
neighborhoods inhabited primarily by members of other races or groups.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982).
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In 1992, the New York State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (Advisory Committee) reviewed nursing home admission practices in
New York and found that there were still significant racial inequities in admission
between African Americans and Caucasians.98 The Advisory Committee's findings
showed that Caucasian patients were three times more likely to get into a quality
nursing home than minority patients. 99
Of the characteristics used to decide whether to admit a patient, race remained
the chief factor, even in nursing homes sponsored by religious organizations, which
were more likely to admit those of a different religious background than those of a
different race.'00 Based on this evidence, the Advisory Committee found that
"discrimination on the basis of race plays a role in the rejection of at least some
minorities by the nursing homes to which they apply for long-term care."''
In 1988, Drs. William Weissert and Cynthia Cready found that there was a
significant delay in transfer of African Americans from hospitals to nursing homes
in North Carolina. 10 2 The authors suggested that this delay was because some
Caucasian nursing home residents wanted to room with those of the same race.'
0 3
To comply with this request, nursing homes intentionally kept rooms and their
facility segregated by denying admittance to African Americans. °4 Denied access
to quality nursing homes, African Americans are relegated to poor-performing
nursing homes, resulting in inequities in quality in the provision of nursing home
care.
Although these studies were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, there is no
evidence that race-based admission decisions have stopped.'0 5 Since the publication
98. See generally MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at 5 ("[M]inorities are in fact
discriminated against in admissions to nursing homes here in New York State ... ").
99. Id. at ii-iii; Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note 91; Sullivan, New Rules Sought, supra
note 91.
100. See MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at 37-38 (citing Jeffrey Amber, Executive
Director of Friends and Relatives of the Institutionalized Aging) (explaining a report that argued that
many religious-based nursing homes would "accept [Caucasian] applicants from other religions but
exclude minority people").
101. Id. at iii.
102. Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 642, 645.
103. See id. at 645 (attributing delays based on race, in part, to "nursing home policies of matching
patients in semiprivate rooms on race or sex in combination with the low prevalence of [non-
Caucasians] and males in the homes").
104. Id.
105. See Smith et al., supra note 63, at 876 (explaining a recent research study that showed that
changes in hospital policies and shifts in payment incentives in the mid-I 980s have led to an increase in
African Americans' use of nursing homes); Grabowski, supra note 92, at 462 (noting, in 2004, that an
explanation for the finding that African Americans are admitted to nursing homes with greater
deficiencies is potential discriminatory practices by the facilities in admission decisions). Because of the
financial burden on hospitals from transfer delays of elderly African Americans, "[hlospitals hired full-
time discharge planners, acquired or built nursing homes or short-stay long-term-care units, and engaged
in a variety of partnerships with long-term-care chains to reduce the placement problems for which they
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of these studies, research studies have focused on the provision of care provided
after patients are admitted to nursing homes,'16 which is easier to track.10 7 This shift
in research is due to the availability of new governmental data that allows
researchers to track racial inequities in the provision of quality nursing home care
once patients are admitted.108 Based on governmental data, these studies suggest
that racial inequities in the provision of quality nursing home care persist.'0 9
C. Inequities in the Quality of Nursing Home Care Provided to African Americans
The quality of nursing home care is defined by the care provided to residents
and the health of the residents after admission to the nursing home. These factors
determine whether a nursing home is in compliance with the Medicaid conditions
now received no reimbursement." Smith et al., supra note 69, at 876. However, this study only reviewed
use data, which does not provide information regarding delays in transfer. Id. at 867. Furthermore, in the
1990s, after the implementation of changed hospital polices and shifts in payment incentives, two
lawsuits were filed regarding delays in transfer to nursing homes. See Taylor v. White, 132 F.R.D. 636,
639-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (challenging the delay in transfer to nursing homes and the poor quality of care
provided African Americans in Philadelphia nursing homes); Linton ex rel. Arnold v. Comn'r of Health
& Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925, 927-28 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (challenging racial discrimination committed by
the state of Tennessee through its policy of limiting the number of Medicaid beds in nursing homes). In
Linton ex rel. Arnold, the court ordered Tennessee to change its polices. 779 F. Supp. at 935.
106. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 8, at 1450 (explaining a recent study describing racial
segregation in nursing homes and its relationship to disparities in quality of care); Grabowski, supra
note 92, at 457 (describing a study that focused on "quality of care at the time of nursing home entry" in
order to examine "potential racial and ethnic differences in the nursing home selection and admission
process").
107. See Smith et al., supra note 8, at 1449-50 (discussing the lack of data and documentation of
minorities' access to high-quality nursing home care); Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., National Healthcare Quality & Disparities Reports,
http://nhqmet.ahrq.gov/nhqrdr/jsp/nhqrdr.jsp (last visited June 14, 2010) (containing data on quality of
care in nursing homes); Am. Health Care Ass'n, OSCAR Data,
http://www.ahcancal.org/researchdata/oscar_data/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 14, 2010)
(providing data of inspection surveys for the purpose of certification for participation in Medicare and
Medicaid).
108. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., AHRQ PUB. No. 03-P004, NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT: UPDATE ON CURRENT
STATUS (2002), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhqrfact.pdf (documenting healthcare quality);
Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, supra note 107 (website where data on quality of care in
nursing homes can be found); Am. Health Care Ass'n, supra note 107 (website with OSCAR data).
Congress established the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in 1999, requiring it to "develop
databases and tools that provide information to States on the quality, access, and use of health care
services provides to their residents." Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-129
sec. 2(a), §§ 901(a), 913(a)(2), 113 Stat. 1653, 1653, 1658.
109. See Smith et al., supra note 8, at 1450-53 (explaining a study showing racial disparities using
data collected from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Online Survey Certification and
Reporting System).
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of participation.1 0 If a nursing home is significantly out of compliance with the
Medicaid conditions of participations, then it can be deemed substandard."'
Substandard care is defined as a significant deficiency in care that caused
actual or serious actual harm to one or more nursing home residents. 112 Substandard
care often results from the failure to provide care to residents, such as the failure to
prevent pressure sores or falls. 1 3 A plethora of research studies have noted racial
inequities in the provision of quality nursing home care.' 14 For example, national
data compiled from Medicare forms showed that African Americans reside in
nursing homes with "lower ratings of cleanliness/maintenance and lighting .... "115
Another study of several states, including New York, Kansas, Mississippi,
and Ohio, found that the quality of care provided Caucasians and African
Americans is different"' l6 African Americans usually receive poor quality care
when compared to Caucasians. For example, the resident assessment instrument
(RAI)," 7 which includes racial data, showed that late-stage pressure sores are more
common to African Americans, while early stage pressure sores are more common
to Caucasians.' t8 According to the researchers, the higher rates of late-stage
pressure sores in African Americans occur because they are commonly
underdiagnosed. 119 Hence, Caucasians received treatment before the pressure sore
110. 42 C.F.R. § 483.1(b) (2009). The conditions of participation used to review Medicaid certified
nursing homes are the Medicare conditions of participation and state requirements. Id. §§ 483.1(b),
488.300. To prevent confusion, I have referred to these requirements as the Medicaid conditions of
participation.
111. Id. § 488.301.
112. Id.
113. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. OEI-02-01-
00600, NURSING HOME DEFICIENCY TRENDS AND SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS CONSISTENCY
22, 26, 28 (2003), available at: http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-01-00600.pdf (identifying "[p]roper
treatment to prevent or treat pressure sores" and "falls among its residents" as categories of quality of
care deficiencies); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/T-HEHS-98-219, CALIFORNIA
NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS IN HOMES
WITH SERIOUS CARE VIOLATIONS 4-6 (1998) (explaining several deficiencies found in California
nursing homes, including residents with pressure sores, weight loss, and a lack of necessary medication).
114. E.g., Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 174; Grabowski, supra note 92, at 462; Mor et al., supra
note 25, at 227-28; Smith, supra note 6, at 859-61.
115. Grabowski, supra note 92, at 456.
116. Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 178-80. The authors also noted that "[i]ndeed, it is possible for a
nursing home to provide, on average, high quality of care and to also exhibit a substantial disparity in
the levels of care received by majority and minority residents." Id. at 174.
117. 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b)(1) (2009). A nursing home is required to assess the condition of every
resident within fourteen days of a resident's admission and whenever there is a significant change in the
resident's condition. Id. § 483.20(b)(2); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., LONG-TERM CARE FACILITY RESIDENT ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT USER'S MANUAL
2-4, 2-12, 5-2 (2009). This data is then coded and transmitted to the Minimum Data Set (MDS), which is
used by states to determine the quality of care in nursing homes. § 483.20(0; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., supra, at 5-1 to -2.
118. Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 175-76.
119. Id. at 176.
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became too severe, while African Americans and other minorities suffered without
treatment until the pressure sores became irreparable. 120 Manifested in many
different ways and forms, poor quality care often translates into poor health
outcomes for African Americans compared to Caucasians.
121
A 2008 study consisting of data from 8,997 nursing homes located in urban
cities throughout the continental United States 122 found that African American
nursing home residents were more likely than Caucasian residents to be
hospitalized for "dehydration, poor nutrition, bedsores and other aliments because
of a gap in the quality of in-house medical care" in nursing homes.12 3 These
ailments arise when residents are not receiving proper care. 24 Researchers noted
that of the 516,082 patients tracked, nineteen percent were hospitalized by the end
of the 150-day follow-up period. 125 Of the nursing home residents hospitalized,
twenty-four percent of African Americans were hospitalized, while only nineteen
percent of Caucasians were hospitalized. 126 Thus, the health of African Americans
residing in nursing homes is often poorer than Caucasians residing in nursing
homes.
The quality of nursing home care is further assessed by nursing home
compliance with Medicaid conditions of participation. The failure to comply with
these conditions results in deficiencies. 127 In a recent national study of nursing
home quality released in 2004, researchers deemed facilities whose primary source
120. See id. (explaining that late-stage pressure sores are more common in minorities compared to
Caucasians).
121. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
122. Andrea Gruneir et al., Relationship Between State Medicaid Policies, Nursing Home Racial
Composition, and the Risk of Hospitalization for Black and White Residents, 43 HEALTH SERVICES RES.
869, 871 (2008).
123. Jackie Spinner, Illness, Race Tied in Study of Care: Comparison Made at Nursing Homes,
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2008, at B1; see also Gruneir et al., supra note 122, at 877 (finding that African
American residents are at greater risk of hospitalization than Caucasian residents).
124. See Nursing Home Quality: Problems, Causes, and Cures: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on
Fin. 2 (2003) (written testimony of Catherine Hawes, Professor, Texas A&M Univ. Sys. Health Sci.
Ctr.), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/071703chtest.pdf (explaining that neglect by
nursing home staff leads to undernutrition, malnutrition, and dehydration); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 113, at 8, 28 (explaining that deficiencies in treatment of pressure sores and provision of
nutrition and hydration are included in categories related to "substandard quality of care").
125. Gruneir et al., supra note 122, at 871, 874.
126. Id. at 874. Additionally, the percentage of residents who had to be hospitalized strongly
correlated with the states' Medicaid rate. Id. at 877. Increasing the Medicaid reimbursement rate by ten
dollars reduced the odds of hospitalization by four percent for Caucasians and twenty-two percent for
African Americans. Id. This suggests that race and Medicaid payment rates are inextricably linked.
127. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2009). A deficiency or citation is a violation of the Medicaid conditions
of participation requirements found in the program regulations. Id. § 483.1(b). There are a total of 190
possible Medicare deficiencies divided into seventeen different categories for which HHS can cite a
nursing home. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 113, at 1. Most deficiencies are categorized into
three main areas: quality of care, § 483.25; quality of life, § 483,15; and resident behavior and facility
practice, § 483.13. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 113, at 8.
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of payment is Medicaid as "lower-tiered facilities" because of their poor quality. 28
They found that African Americans are three to five times more likely to be in
lower-tiered facilities than Caucasians.
29
The placement of a majority of African Americans in lower-tiered facilities is
significant because these nursing homes are more likely to be terminated from the
Medicaid program because of substandard quality, though not for Title VI
violations. 3 ° These lower-tiered facilities have fewer nurses, more quality of care
deficiencies, higher incidences of pressure sores, use physical restraints more, and
have inadequate pain control and use of antipsychotic medications. 13 1 Studies have
shown that Caucasians reside in nursing homes with an average of 5.13
deficiencies, whereas African Americans reside in nursing homes with an average
of 7.39 deficiencies.
3 2
Additionally, an investigation by the Chicago Reporter of Illinois nursing
homes showed that African Americans residing in nursing homes received poor
quality care compared to Caucasians.' 33 Of the fifty-one predominately African
American nursing homes located in Illinois, there is just one rated "excellent" by
the federal government.' 34 These predominately African American facilities get the
worst federal ratings for quality and on average have more deficiencies than
facilities where a majority of residents are Caucasian. 3 5 In Chicago, a majority of
the predominantly African American homes received "the worst rating-a one on a
five-point scale- . . . compared with [eleven] percent of [Caucasian] nursing
homes."' 36 The investigation "also found that the staff at Illinois' [African
American] nursing homes spent less time daily with residents than staff at facilities
where a majority of the residents are [Caucasian]. Of that time, [African American]
residents got a smaller percentage of time with more-skilled registered nurses than
facilities where the residents were [Caucasian].' 3 7
Overall, a review of the empirical data provides a dismal picture of the
accessibility of quality nursing home care available to elderly African Americans.
Three main barriers have been suggested to explain why racial inequities in health
128. Mor et al., supra note 25, at 227, 230.
129. Id. at 238 & fig.2. This ratio varies by state from zero to nine, and the only state where the ratio
is zero is Kentucky. Id.
130. Id. at 234-35, 246.
131. Id. at 236, 239-40.
132. Grabowski, supra note 92, at 458.
133. Lowenstein, supra note 17 (explaining that predominantly African American nursing homes
received low ratings more often than predominantly Caucasian nursing homes and that residents at the
former received less staff time than those at the latter).
134. Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, Lower Standards, CHI. REP., July 1, 2009, available at
http://www.chicagoreporter.com/index.php/c/CoverStories/d/LowerStandards.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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care persist: residential segregation, 138  socioeconomic status, 139  and racial
discrimination. 40 It is clear from the literature that no one factor has been accepted
as the central reason for the inequities. However, a review of the nursing home
system and its problems suggests that racial discrimination is the central reason for
racial inequities in accessing quality nursing home care.14
First, residential segregation in quality nursing homes was even greater than
the residential segregation in the neighborhood. 42  Second, even when
socioeconomic status was controlled, racial inequities in access to quality nursing
homes persisted. 43 Finally, a review of the literature discussing the causes for
residential segregation and socioeconomic status of African Americans identifies
racial discrimination as one of the reasons for the continuation of the ills of African
Americans. 44 If racial inequities in the quality of nursing home care are not caused
by residential segregation or socioeconomic status, why is racial discrimination the
culprit?
In sum, based on empirical research, race remains the central barrier to
elderly African Americans accessing quality nursing home care. African Americans
138. See generally Wallace, supra note 8, at 672-78 (determining that residential segregation affects
the medical system because of its economic structure); Wallace et al., supra note 8, at S104-07
(analyzing the causes of racial differences in access to long-term care); Williams, supra note 8, at 177-
80 (discussing residential segregation's impact on health through employment); Williams & Collins,
supra note 8, at 404-05 (arguing that racial residential segregation is the cornerstone of disparities in
heath status between African Americans and Caucasians).
139. See generally Jim Mitchell et al., Difference by Race in Long-Term Care Plans, 19 J. APPLIED
GERONTOLOGY 424, 435-38 (2000) (reporting on the role of family care in long-term care plans of
African Americans and Caucasians); Mor et al., supra note 25, at 227 (arguing that nursing home care is
a two-tiered system); Nadereh Pourat et al., Postadmission Disparities in Nursing Home Stays of Whites
and Minority Elderly, 12 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 352, 352-53, 362-63 (2001)
(determining that a person's length of stay includes socio-cultural characteristics); Wallace, supra note
8, at 665-66, 672-78 (finding that employment patterns, retirement income, and health insurance differ
for elderly African Americans as compared to Caucasians); Wallace et al., supra note 8, at S 104 (stating
that the need for long-term health care is higher for minorities considering their low socioeconomic
status); Williams, supra note 8, at 177 (finding that racism restricts socioeconomic attainment for
members of minority groups); Williams & Collins, supra note 8, at 406 (arguing that institutional
discrimination affects income levels for minorities).
140. Based on the empirical data, researchers have argued that the actions of the nursing homes are
blatantly and intentionally discriminatory. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588, 591-92 (finding
that race affects patient delay in accessing nursing homes); Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 175
(determining that racial differences exist in both medical care and nursing home usage); Smith, supra
note 6, at 861 (determining that nursing-home patient treatment is influenced by race); Weissert &
Cready, supra note 6, at 645 (concluding that non-Caucasian patients faced longer delays than other
patients).
141. See infra notes 142-49 accompanying text.
142. Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 175.
143. See Lowenstein, supra note 17 (finding that poverty only partially explained racial inequities in
nursing homes).
144. Smith, supra note 6, at 862-64, 866; Smith et al., supra note 8, at 1456; Smith et al., supra note
63, at 861 (2008).
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in North Carolina were delayed three to twelve days in transfer to nursing homes. 45
In Pennsylvania, elderly African Americans were delayed in transfer for months
because they could not find a nursing home to accept them, and they had to reside
in the hospital.146 The delays in transfer result from a denial of admission to quality
nursing homes because of race. Research studies in New York and North Carolina
show that race remains the greatest predictor of accessing quality nursing home
care.' 47 Caucasian patients were three times more likely to be admitted to a quality
nursing home than were African Americans. 148 Thus, based on this research, race
remains the central factor in accessing nursing home care.
Although research studies of racial inequities in the provision of prompt,
quality nursing home care have been limited to a small number of states, the studies
conducted are paradigmatic of national practices as evidenced by civil rights
complaints and reports. The Secretary and the states have been provided with the
above-referenced research as well as civil rights complaints and reports, which
show that some government-funded nursing homes continue to violate Title VI.
However, little if anything has been done, as the next section details.
149
II. CIVIL RIGHTS FAILURES IN HEALTH CARE
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States has failed
to put an end to racial discrimination in health care. This situation is due to
statutory and regulatory failures. 150 Even though the statutory and regulatory
language of Title VI provides a strong statement banning racial discrimination, it
fails to provide meaningful sanctions for violators. Even if meaningful sanctions
existed on paper, there is clear evidence that HHS and the states would still fail to
adequately enforce Title VI. 15'
145. Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588 tbl.3; Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 632.
146. Taylor v. White, 132 F.R.D. 636, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
147. MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at ii; Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 641,
645.
148. See MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at ii-iii; Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra
note 91 (revealing that in New York City, Caucasian patients tended to be accepted at better nursing
homes while racial minorities were relegated to poorer ones); Sullivan, New Rules Sought, supra note 91
(same).
149. See infra Part II.
150. President Lyndon B. Johnson championed the Civil Rights Act, which was enacted in memorial
to President Kennedy. SMITH, supra note 12, at 100. Although leading the charge for the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act, President Johnson did not fully support all enforcement actions. For instance,
during the passage of Title VI, Congress and the President noted that unlike hospitals, nursing homes
were more than simple treatment centers. Id. at 159-61, 236-52. Nursing homes were viewed as private
residences funded by the government. Id. at 159-60. In the 1960s, Congress and the President were
unwilling to wage a massive attack to integrate these "homes." Id. Consequently, Title VI enforcement
fell apart at the start because nursing homes were viewed as private homes of citizens. Id. at 159.
151. See HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 6-9, 73-74, 203-04 (discussing how thus far,
HHS has not sufficiently addressed the problem of minority access to quality health care).
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As mandated by law, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR)
reviewed the progress of HHS' Title VI enforcement in 1974, 1996, and 1999.152
Each time the USCCR found that HHS was not fulfilling the mandates of Title
VI. 153 There are multiple dimensions to this issue. Firstly, neither HHS nor USCCR
monitor the states' enforcement of Title VI.' 54 Secondly, the most recent studies
conducted in New York and the lawsuits in Tennessee and Pennsylvania suggest
that the states are also guilty of failing to enforce Title VI to prevent racial
discrimination in health care. For example, the problems of racial inequities in
admission and the provision of nursing home care were first presented to the New
York state government in 1984.115 Eight years later, a 1992 study completed by the
New York State Advisory Committee to the USCCR showed that these same
problems persisted.1
56
These federal and state governmental failures have spanned both Democratic
and Republican administrations. Forty-five years after the enactment of Title VI,
the time has come for the civil rights failures of the federal government and the
states to be corrected.
A. Statutory Failures in Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Health Care
Offering the promise of equal access to quality heath care to African
Americans, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act was doomed from the start. Section 602
of Title VI requires the federal government to ensure that entities receiving federal
funding, such as nursing homes, do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.'57 Although the language of Title VI clearly prohibits racial
discrimination in health care by those receiving federal funding, the remedial
scheme is ineffectual for two reasons.
First, under Title VI, the only remedy available to the government is
termination from participation in government programs. 58 The USCCR has
determined that when termination is the only government sanction, the trend has
been for the government to try to avoid imposing termination by allowing nursing
homes to voluntarily comply with the applicable regulations. 59 In fact, the
regulations governing Title VI enforcement state that HHS is "to the fullest extent
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006) (stating that the federal government will enforce
nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs); FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at
1-2 (noting that the Commission monitored the federal agencies Title VI program periodically).
153. FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 1-2.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note 91; Sullivan, New Rules Sought, supra note 91.
156. See MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at ii-iii.
157. See § 2000d-l.
158. Id.
159. Roma Stewart, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, Statement Before the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights: The Federal Responsibility for Ensuring Equal Access, in CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY, supra note 48, at 39, 48.
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practicable seek the cooperation of recipients in obtaining compliance ... and shall
provide assistance and guidance to recipients to help them comply voluntarily
.... 160 Thus, HHS has tried to obtain compliance with Title VI through assurances
and voluntary cooperation.161
Second, even if termination was an option, in a particular case, it is an overly
burdensome undertaking. Termination becomes effective only after the agency
submits a full written report to both the House and the Senate committees
responsible for the funding. 62 Thus, it is not surprising that HHS has never
terminated a nursing home for Title VI violations. 63 It is also noteworthy that no
other termination process by HHS, including the termination process of nursing
homes from participation in the Medicaid program because of poor quality, relies
on the approval of Congress before becoming final.' 64 Requiring HHS to first seek
voluntary compliance and approval from Congress before termination is initiated
makes Title VI little more than an ineffectual guide to what should happen, rather
than a law that the nursing home administrator is required to fulfill.
The failure of Congress to provide a range of graduated remedies or sanctions
other than termination for the violation of Title VI has severely restricted the
regulation of health care entities under Title VI. The statutory failures to eliminate
racial discrimination have translated into marginal enforcement of Title VI that has
left African Americans relegated to substandard nursing homes. 1
65
B. Regulatory Failures in Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Health Care
1. Civil Rights Failures by HHS
Responsible for enforcing Section 602 as applied to the health care industry,
HHS is required to promulgate regulations to enforce Title VI. 16 6 Arguably, HHS
has complied with the dictates of Title VI by promulgating regulations.
67
However, critics have noted that HHS "permitted formal assurances of compliance
to substitute for verified changes in behavior, failed to collect comprehensive data
or conduct affirmative compliance reviews, relied too heavily on complaints by
160. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 80.8(c).
163. See FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 230-31 (noting that, as of 1996, HHS
had not terminated any nursing homes for Title VI violations). For a discussion of general compliance-
based terminations nationally, see Joseph Angelelli et al., Oversight of Nursing Homes: Pruning the
Tree or Just Spotting Bad Apples?, 43 THE GERONTOLOGIST (SuPP. 2) 67, 67-75 (2003).
164. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.456(c) (regulating the termination of provider agreements).
165. See generally Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 175 (discussing racial disparities in access to long-
term care).
166. 45 C.F.R. § 80.1.
167. See FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 218-20 (describing the organization
and duties of HHS with regard to Title VI).
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victims of discrimination, inadequately investigated matters brought to the
Department, and failed to sanction recipients for demonstrated violations. '168
Moreover, as noted by USCCR, there is ample evidence that HHS has consistently
and systematically failed to enforce Title VI to prohibit racial discrimination in
health care because of lack of funding and lax enforcement.'
69
In 1967, HHS created OCR to be the primary civil rights office for HHS to
enforce Title VI. 170 Initially, most of OCR's Title VI efforts were devoted to
education desegregation, while "only [four] percent of OCR's compliance efforts
were devoted to health and social services .... ,1 In a 1980 oral and written
statement to the USCCR, the Director of the OCR, Roma Stewart, highlighted the
fact that the office had focused primarily on putting an end to racial discrimination
in education; 172 however, with the creation of the U.S. Department of Education,
she stated that OCR would focus exclusively on putting an end to racial
discrimination in health care and promised to devote resources to that goal.
173
Director Stewart promised that OCR resources and staff would be dedicated to
eradicating racial discrimination in health care. 174 Unfortunately, as USCCR noted
in 1996, Director Stewart's promise for more resources and staff devoted to health
care concerns never materialized.
175
In 1981, OCR's staff consisted of 524 positions and the requested budget
totaled $19.8 million. 176 By the 1990s, HHS' financial support and staffing of OCR
decreased significantly. 77 Specifically, OCR's funding decreased beginning in
1994 and did not reach the levels spent in 1994 until 2000.178 According to the
USCCR, "[s]ince 2001, OCR's funding has continued increasing, but the increases
have become smaller each year and the increases have not kept pace with
inflation. 1
79
168. Lado, supra note 14, at 28.
169. FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 240; HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra
note 18, at 1, 5-6, 8-9, 73-74.
170. Smith, supra note 18, at 86. Most divisions of HHS regulating operating programs thought of
OCR as a nuisance. Id. at 87.
171. Id.
172. Stewart, supra note 159, at 39.
173. Id. at 39-41.
174. Id. at40-41,44.
175. See FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 223 (stating that HHS budget and staff
resources devoted to Title VI enforcement decreased).
176. Id. at 222 & tbl.6.1.
177. Id.; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT:
THE PRESIDENT'S 2006 REQUEST ch. 5 & tbl.S.1 (2005), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/crfund06/crfund06.pdf [hereinafter FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT] (determining that OCR funding decreased progressively throughout the decade when
accounting for inflation).
178. FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 177, at ch. 5.
179. Id.
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The pattern of decreasing resource limitations has had a negative impact on
OCR staffing levels, which has directly affected the ability of OCR to enforce Title
VI. Between 1981 and 1993, OCR's staff declined from 524 to 309, while the OCR
staff specifically responsible for Title VI enforcement decreased from 246 to
108.180 From 1994 to 1999, OCR's staff decreased from 284 in 1994 to a low of
210 in 1999.1' Consequently, "[twenty-six] percent fewer employees were
available to perform its civil rights activities including complaint investigations,
post-grant reviews and investigations, pre-grant reviews, monitoring and voluntary
compliance reviews, and outreach. 18 2 In contrast, OCR's staff increased beginning
in 2000, and continued to increase by ten percent each year in response to its duties
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (privacy of medical
records), 183 which has nothing to do with Title VI or racial inequities. 184
The need to increase OCR's funding and staffing was raised in 1980 by OCR
Director Stewart, who planned to use OCR's "resources on systemwide compliance
reviews, where patterns of discrimination can be found and corrected in ways that
benefit larger numbers of people than are helped by individual case resolutions."'
' 85
As she argued, this aspect of monitoring through systemic compliance reviews
would enable OCR to "achieve more far-reaching results than can be obtained by
investigation of an individual complaint" because it would produce more
significant outcomes. 186 Director Stewart pledged to "have a full-fledged operation
that can concentrate exclusively on an increased investigative effort, development
of policy, immediate and long-range planning, and the development of a data
collection program."'
187
This full-fledged operation was to address "some specific areas in which past
investigations have revealed frequent problems," including "[a]dmission practices
180. FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 222. The decrease in staff effected OCR's
ability to enforce Title VI. OCR's internal procedures for complying with Title VI requirements called
for detailed review of new nursing home applicants, yet over a twelve-year span, from 1981 to 1993,
most of OCR's reviews were cursory desk-audits. Id. at 227 tbl.6.2. These desk-audits included a review
of pre-award assurances of nondiscrimination by nursing homes, which according to the USCCR did not
provide sufficient information to determine actual Title VI compliance. Id. at 220-21.
181. FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 177, at ch. 5.
182. Id.
183. Id. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was enacted to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system and required HHS to adopt national
standards for electronic health care transactions and code sets, unique health identifiers, and security.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d to 1320d-9 (2006 &
West Supp. 2009)). HIPAA also included provisions that mandated the adoption of federal privacy
protections for individually identifiable health information. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1 (2006).
184. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1 (lacking any discussion of Title VI or race).
185. Roma J. Stewart, Health Care and Civil Rights, in CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY, supra note 48, at 318, 321-22. Because of lawsuits against the government for its failure to
enforce Title VI, much of its investigative staff was applied to address individual complaints. Id. at 322.
186. Id.
187. Stewart, supra note 159, at 39.
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of hospitals and long term care facilities [and]... [t]he failure of State Medicaid
agencies to monitor hospitals and other providers to ensure that they do not
discriminate....
OCR had also identified several problems with discrimination in nursing
homes that included: "[n]ursing homes that limit Medicaid admissions to a set
percentage of total numbers of patients[;] . . . [n]ursing homes that segregate
minorities . . . once they have been admitted[; and f]raternally owned nursing
homes that explicitly refuse to admit people of a particular race or national
origin.' 89 According to Director Stewart, African Americans were generally barred
from nursing homes by racial discrimination, so that they were often forced to
"liv[e] in unlicensed and substandard boarding homes where they cannot receive
Medicaid benefits, and where the quality of care is inferior. Although most of these
problems relate to accessibility, they also raise questions about the quality of care
in hospitals and nursing homes."'1 90
In her statement to USCCR, Director Stewart promised to take steps to
address these problems by issuing regulations and providing guidance.' 9' These
regulations were supposed to propose new sanctions to be used against perpetrators
because the agency admittedly did not like to impose termination from participation
in government programs, the only remedy available to OCR. 92 Unfortunately,
twenty-nine years later, Director Stewart's assurances of government enforcement
of Title VI have never fully materialized. OCR never established the guidelines or
implemented any new sanctions as Director Stewart promised. 93 Furthermore,
OCR has been lax in its enforcement of Title VI.
194
188. Stewart, supra note 185, at 320 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 324-25.
190. Id. at 325.
191. See id. at 320 (stressing the need for policy guidance). HHS issued a proposed rule on
nondiscrimination requirements for block grants in 1986, but never issued a final rule. FEDERAL TITLE
VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 224. HHS has also failed to monitor state regulation of Title VI
compliance under Medicaid. Id. at 232.
192. Stewart, supra note 159, at 49-51. In response to a question from the USCCR Commissioner
Freeman regarding enforcement measures employed once discrimination is proven, Stewart said:
Unfortunately, under the statute, the main remedy that we have is [to] cutoff of Federal
funds. OCR is reluctant to cut off [sic] funds to hospitals because the very beneficiaries that
we seek to assist would be further damaged. However, once a finding of discrimination is
made, we undertake the attempt to achieve voluntary compliance. Most of our cases are,
in fact, resolved through voluntary decisions.
Id. at 48.
193. HHS has not revised these regulations to include changes made by the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, and they do not address block grant programs. FEDERAL
TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 224. Therefore, states regulate all Title VI compliance by
Medicaid certified facilities. See id. (noting HHS' lack of federal Title VI guidelines) HHS issued a
proposed rule on nondiscrimination requirements for Medicaid in 1986, but never issued a final rule. Id.
194. See, e.g., id. at 226 (noting in the entire 1993 fiscal year, OCR only initiated twelve compliance
reviews).
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First and foremost, OCR has not kept up with reviewing individual
complaints. A 2006 USCCR Report, noted that OCR staff levels fell between 1994
and 1999, while "OCR's pending [complaint] inventory rose exponentially, from
46 in 1994 to 1,881 in 1999 .... In 2000, OCR's staff increased by five, but was
still not enough to handle increased post-grant review and investigation
inventory."
'1 95
Second, in its thirty-seven year history, OCR has never terminated a nursing
home proven to have violated Title VI. 196 Numerous nursing homes have been
found out of compliance with Title VI, but instead of initiating legal or
administrative action, OCR has only required statements of commitment to stop
discrimination.
197
Finally, OCR never instituted systematic reviews of nursing homes.
19 8
Instead, it has relied on private complaints and desk audits.' 99 Nevertheless,
according to the U.S. House of Representatives, OCR failed to even complete this
task.200
As early as 1987, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Government Operations determined "that OCR unnecessarily delayed case
processing, allowed discrimination to continue without federal intervention,
routinely conducted superficial and inadequate investigations, failed to advise
regional offices on policy and procedure for resolving cases, and abdicated its
responsibility to ensure that HHS policies are consistent with civil rights law,
among other things. 2 0' The same committee "criticized OCR's reluctance to
sanction noncompliant recipients and recommended that OCR pursue
investigations of complaints as well as compliance reviews in more systematic
ways." 20 2 Since this report, not much has changed.
Fifteen years later, there was little progress to report. In its 2002 report,
USCCR noted that OCR's civil rights system was rudimentary.2 °3 Although
195. FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 177, at ch. 5.
196. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
197. See. e.g., FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 230-31 ("Of the [twenty-one]
Title VI compliance reviews completed in 1993, [ten] resulted in findings of noncompliance. Each of
these ... was.., resolved through corrective action commitments ... ").
198. See id. at 220 (determining that HHS does not actively engage in Title VI enforcement).
199. See id. at 220-21 (stating that operating divisions conduct desk audits as opposed to post-award
reviews).
200. Lado, supra note 14, at 29-30 (citing H. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF
THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, H.R. REP. No.
100-56, at 14, 22-25 (1987)).
201. Id. at29.
202. Id. at 29-30.
203. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONDED
TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS? VOLUME 1: A BLUEPRINT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 5-6
(2002), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/tenyrchekupvoll.pdf
[hereinafter TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP].
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USCCR noted that HHS had established civil rights enforcement programs,
USCCR found that these programs were unsatisfactory. °4 USCCR "found [OCR's]
efforts to develop policy and conduct civil rights enforcement activities to be
halfhearted., 20 5 Although Title VI provided the legal framework to eliminate racial
discrimination in health care, USCCR stated without equivocation that "HHS lacks
a vigorous civil rights enforcement program, and the activities of OCR appear to
have little impact on the agency as a whole. 20 6
The federal government's failure to enforce Title VI, which prohibits
government-funded racial discrimination, has led to the perpetuation of racially
discriminatory practices in the long-term care system. By failing to punish nursing
homes that violate Title VI, the federal government has implicitly accepted the
practice of racial discrimination. The federal government's failures have been
exacerbated by state actions of setting low reimbursement rates for Medicaid
certified nursing homes 207 and the delegation of admissions decisions to the
perpetrators of racial discrimination.20
2. Civil Rights Failures by the States
The limited record of states' enforcement of Title VI has not been much better
than HHS. Because the states administer the Medicaid program, the states are
required to determine Title VI compliance of nursing homes and report their
findings to OCR.209 To fulfill this mandate, states are required to review private
complaints and conduct annual reviews of compliance documents. 2'0 There is
limited information regarding the states' efforts to fulfill this mandate; however,
the available information, which includes empirical data,21 1 government reports,
212
204. Id. at 5.
205. Id.
206. HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 74.
207. See, e.g., Thomas Day, About Nursing Homes, http://www.longtermcarelink.net/eldercare/
nursingjhome.htm (last visited June 14, 2010) (stating that Medicaid reimbursement rates are not
uniform from state to state, and that some nursing home associations claim that eighty-five percent of
their members are not meeting costs with Medicaid).
208. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 863 (explaining how nursing homes have much discretion in
admissions).
209. See FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 224 (indicating that HHS has not
published any Title VI guidelines for its programs). According to the USCCR, "HHS has not
implemented a systematic process to review [s]tates' Title VI compliance activities on a regular basis"
under Medicaid. Id. at 232. Furthermore, the states' Title VI compliance websites are not linked to OCR.
E.g., Div. of Minority Health & Disparity Elimination, Tenn. Dep't of Health, Office of Title VI,
http://health.state.tn.us/dmhde/title6.shtml (last visited June 14, 2010); Office of Citizen Servs., N.C.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Limited English
Proficiency (LEP), http://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/ocs/title6.htm (last visited June 14, 2010).
210. See FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT, supra note 29, at 232 (describing state compliance
requirements with Title VI).
211. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 588-92 (comparing delayed discharge days and race
with controls for other predictors of delay); Smith, supra note 6, at 862-66 (analyzing reimbursement
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and case law,213 shows that the states' efforts in fulfilling their duties under Title VI
have been ineffectual.
States do not have agencies comparable to OCR that are responsible for Title
VI compliance in health care. For example, in Tennessee, the Division of Minority
Health and Disparity Elimination, of the Tennessee Department of Health, enforces
Title VI and submits a yearly Title VI Compliance Plan and Implementation
Manual to the State Comptroller's Office.2 14 However, in North Carolina, there is
one Title VI compliance attorney in the Office of General Counsel, a division of the
North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services.215 In Illinois, there is no
one responsible for reviewing Title VI compliance in health care. 216 Therefore, it is
impossible to determine who is responsible in the states for Title VI enforcement in
health care.
Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the states' Title VI
compliance efforts from government reports. If any reports are issued, they are
sporadic. For instance, the New York Advisory Committee issued the first report
regarding issues of racial inequities in health care in 1964.217 Twenty-eight years
later, the New York Advisory Committee issued a report regarding racial inequities
cause by racial discrimination in the admission practices of nursing homes. 2  As a
result of the report, New York required nursing homes that kept a waiting list for
rates and fixed-price payment methods); Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 632-42 (reviewing the
number of days a patient was delayed before being granted admission, and discussing factors
contributing thereto).
212. E.g., MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at 15; TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP, supra note 203,
at 5-6, 26-27 & n.143. See also Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note 91 (describing the release of
civil rights documents required by the State Health Department on nursing homes); Sullivan, New Rules
Sought, supra note 91 (discussing the allegations of a New York State task force studying racial
segregation in nursing homes).
213. See, e.g., Taylor v. White, 132 F.R.D. 636, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that Medicaid
recipients had standing to bring action against state officials for discrimintaory practices in Medicaid-
based nursing home admissions); Linton ex rel. Arnold v. Comm'r of Health & Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925,
935-36 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (ruling that Tennessee's bed certification policies fostered racial
discrimination and ordered the state to change its policies).
214. Div. of Minority Health & Disparity Elimination, Tenn. Dep't of Health, supra note 209.
215. Office of Citizen Servs., N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 209.
216. Conversation with staff of the Illinois Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Long-Term Care (Sept.
10, 2009). In response to my testimony before the Public Health Committee of the Illinois Senate, I was
contacted by an attorney at the Illinois Department of Public Health. See The Persistence of Racial
Inequities in Nursing Home Care: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Public Health, 96th Gen. Assem.
(Ill. 2009) (statement of Ruqaiijah Yearby) (on file with author). The attorney told me that although
there is no written policy, complaints of racial discrimination are forward to either OCR or the Illinois
Human Rights Department. Conversation with staff of the Illinois Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of
Long-Term Care (Feb. 2, 2010).
217. See generally MINORITY ELDERLY ACCESS, supra note 25, at ii (referencing the 1964 report).
218. See id. (noting how the Committee's 1992 report discussed the level of access that minorities
have to health services, and examined how New York State nursing homes treat minorities, including in
the area of admissions).
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admissions to make the lists public. 219 However, this did not change the practices of
most nursing homes because they did not keep waiting lists for admission.
According to David Barton Smith, as long as nursing homes made a "good
faith" effort by marketing with nondiscriminatory language and submitting written
assurances of nondiscrimination, the states certified nursing homes to participate in
Medicaid without meaningful investigation of the veracity of these assurances.22 °
After certifying the nursing homes, states gave these nursing homes full discretion
in admission decisions. 221 Some nursing homes have used this discretion to
implement policies that deny admission to African Americans. For example, in
North Carolina, some nursing homes deny admission to African Americans because
some Caucasian nursing home residents wanted to room with those of the same
race.222 In New York, studies show that some quality nursing homes deny
admission to African Americans relegating them to substandard nursing homes.223
Furthermore, in Ohio a nursing home was alleged to deny admission to African
Americans because of their race.224 Unchecked by the states, these practices have
become standard and reinforce a separate and unequal system.225 Lawsuits have
challenged these discriminatory admission practices; 226 however, there have been
no systemic changes in state regulation of nursing home admission policies, except
in Tennessee.227
Tennessee has implemented a regulatory framework that tracks and addresses
discriminatory admission practices by nursing homes. In response to a lawsuit,
22
the state requires all nursing homes receiving Medicaid payments to submit
admission data.2 29 This data is checked against mandated admission lists and the
medical records of admitted patients to ensure that the nursing home is not
discriminating. 230 Unfortunately, Tennessee's policies are not standard across the
219. Conversation with Margaret Flint, Prof. of Law, Pace Law Sch.; Pres. of Friends & Relatives of
Institutionalized Aged (a nursing home advocacy organization); Member of the Board of Directors,
Westchester Residential Opportunities (Sept. 2, 2009).
220. SMITH, supra note 12, at 236.
221. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
222. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591 (speculating that a longer delay in African
American placement in nursing homes was due to racial preferences in patient roommate selection);
Weissert & Cready, supra note 6, at 642 (same).
223. MINORITY ELDERLY AcCESS, supra note 25, at ii-iii; Sullivan, Study Charges Bias, supra note
91; Sullivan, New Rules Sought, supra note 9 1.
224. Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 5, at 4-6.
225. See cases cited supra note 5.
226. E.g., Taylor v. White, 132 F.R.D. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Linton ex rel. Arnold v. Cormm'r of
Health & Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925, 927 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
227. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
228. See Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 926, 936 (ordering the State of Tennessee to submit a plan to
redress the disparate impact its bed certification policy had on minority Medicaid patients).
229. TENN. COMP. R. & REGs. 1200-13-01-.08 (2009).
230. Id.
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nation. In Illinois, there is no mention of Title VI or a prohibition against racial
discrimination in the laws governing long-term care facilities, such as nursing
homes. 231 Therefore, Illinois does not regulate nursing homes Title VI compliance.
In New York, the regulations prohibit nursing homes from denying admission
based on race.232 However, the law fails to provide enforcement procedures.
Overall the failures of Title VI are linked to statutory and regulatory failures
to eliminate racial discrimination in health care. The USCCR has stated that "[i]f
OCR continues to focus its enforcement on the more tangible civil rights violations,
without delving into the reasons they exist in the first place, it will fail to recognize
and eliminate the true sources of inequity." 233 Consistent with this perspective, the
USCCR recommended a reorganization of the entire civil rights structure to
prohibit racial discrimination in health care. Specifically, the USCCR suggested
that "OCR . . .conduct broad-based, systemic compliance reviews on a rotating
basis in all federally funded health care facilities, at least every [three] years. '
234
These recommendations would improve the entire health care delivery system.
However, because of the historical racial inequities in this industry, additional
changes, which are discussed below, need to be made in the nursing home
enforcement system if discrimination is to be ended.
III. PUTTING AN END TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION THROUGH CHANGES TO THE
NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
To put an end to racial discrimination in nursing homes, civil rights
enforcement must be integrated into every facet of regulation of nursing homes.
While the government has improved the quality of care provided to nursing home
residents under the nursing home enforcement system, the Title VI enforcement
system has been ignored. The time has come for both systems to be integrated to
ensure access to quality health care for all nursing home residents.
Integrating these systems would provide significant benefits. The burden of
investigating racial inequities would fall on those actually regulating the nursing
home enforcement system instead of the under-funded and under-staffed civil
rights offices of HHS and the states. The administrative burden on those regulating
the nursing home enforcement system would be minimal because they already
collect racial data.235 Moreover, integration would allow for the imposition of
sanctions that are used in the nursing home enforcement system, such as fines,
231. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1-101 to -131 (West 2000) (omitting any reference to Title
VI or racial discrimination from the state's Nursing Home Care Act).
232. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.26(i)(i)(ix) (2009).
233. HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE, supra note 18, at 203.
234. Id.
235. See Smith et al., supra note 63, at 867-68 (analyzing state data, and noting that states
"promulgate and enforce regulations related to nursing homes including those related to civil-rights
laws").
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rather than termination of Medicaid provider agreement, which HHS rarely
imposes in any situation.
Although Title VI compliance is mentioned in the regulations governing the
nursing home enforcement system,236 the systems remain separate. For instance,
Title VI enforcement and nursing home enforcement systems are enforced by
different federal237 and state entities, 238 with no collaboration. The overwhelming
evidence points to the policy conclusion that to be meaningful, the integration of
civil rights enforcement must go beyond these textual references at every level of
government. It must include sharing resources, personnel, and remedies.
A. History of Nursing Home and Title VI Enforcement Systems
When Congress enacted the Medicaid Act, it tried to induce nursing homes to
comply with the nondiscriminatory requirements of Title VI and regulate the
236. 42 C.F.R. § 442.12(d)(2) (2009); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (2009).
237. On the federal level, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), a division of HHS, enforces Title VI,
while the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), also a division of HHS, enforces the
nursing home regulations. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUB. No. OEI-06-03-00410, NURSING HOME ENFORCEMENT: APPLICATION OF MANDATORY
REMEDIES 1-10 (2006) (discussing CMS enforcement of nursing home regulations); Office of Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OCR Nondiscrimination Laws, Regulations, and
Standards, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/resources/laws/index.html (last visited June 14, 2010)
(discussing OCR enforcement of nondiscrimination laws). When you visit state websites regarding
nursing home enforcement, they have a link to CMS's Nursing Home Compare website. E.g., Tenn.
Dep't of Health, Nursing Home Information, http://health.state.tn.us/nursinghomes/ (last visited June 14,
2010); N.C. Div. of Aging & Adult Servs., Nursing Homes, http://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/aging/
nhome.htm (last visited June 14, 2010). However, even though the states are responsible for Title VI
compliance, OCR's websites does not provide links to state websites. Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., How to File a Civil Rights Complaint, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/
complaints/index.html (last visited June 14, 2010). Instead OCR requests all complaints be submitted to
regional OCR offices. Id.
238. The regulation of Title VI and nursing homes is done differently in each state; however, the
enforcement remains separate. For example, in Tennessee, the Division of Minority Health and
Disparity Elimination enforces Title VI, while the Division of Health Care Facilities regulates nursing
home enforcement system. Div. of Minority Health & Disparity Elimination, Tenn. Dep't of Health,
supra note 209; Tenn. Dep't of Health, supra note 237. Although both divisions are a part of the
Tennessee Department of Health, the Division of Minority Health and Disparity Elimination submits a
Title VI Compliance Plan and Implementation Manual to the State Comptroller's Office yearly, while
the Division of Health Care Facilities works with the State and CMS. In North Carolina, there is a Title
VI compliance attorney in the Office of General Counsel, while the Division of Aging and Adult
Services regulates the nursing home enforcement system. Office of Citizen Servs., N.C. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., supra note 209; N.C. Div. of Aging & Adult Servs., supra note 237. The Title VI
compliance attorney and the Division of Aging and Adult Services are a part of the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services. However, one person handles Title VI compliance for all
health care entities, whereas an entire division is in charge of nursing home enforcement. Office of
Citizen Servs., N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 209.
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quality of health care provided by nursing homes. 239 Both the broader Title VI
enforcement system and the nursing home enforcement system were implemented
in 1965 .240 Both enforcement systems started on shaky ground; yet the nursing
home enforcement system has been effective in providing meaningful
improvements in the provision of quality nursing home care, whereas the civil
rights system has not.
Congress tried to use Medicaid funding to ensure compliance with Title VI,
241
which was instrumental in putting an end to racial discrimination in hospitals
across the country. 2 Nursing homes, however, were not interested in government
funding, nor was the government dedicated to enforcing Title VI. As Professor
David Barton Smith notes, when Title VI was enacted "President Johnson
apparently had decided not to enforce compliance in nursing homes, to rely on
paper assurances alone. 243 Hence, nursing homes were allowed to continue their
discriminatory practices. 44
During the 1960s and 1970s, the low reimbursement rates of Medicaid led
many nursing homes to forgo participation in the programs.245 Instead, nursing
homes sought private pay patients. 46 By the time nursing homes began
participating in these programs in the 1980s, the issue of Title VI enforcement was
no longer a focal point for the government. 47 Instead, the government's main
239. See 42 C.F.R. § 442.12(d)(2) (requiring a facility to comply with civil rights requirements);
SMITH, supra note 12, at 159-61 (discussing federal efforts to ensure compliance with Title VI). The
Medicare Act was also used to induce compliance with Title VI. SMITH, supra note 12, at 159-61.
240. SMITH, supra note 12, at 108-10 (Title VI enforcement system); Virender Kumar et al., OBRA
1987 and the Quality of Nursing Home Care, 6 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 49, 51 (2006)
(nursing home enforcement system).
241. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006) (directing federal agencies funding
programs or activities "to effectuate the provisions of [the Civil Rights Act] with respect to such
program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in
connection with which the action is taken").
242. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 137 (discussing successful efforts to secure Title VI compliance).
Faced with the loss of a substantial source of revenue stream, most hospitals integrated overnight. See
id. (describing the hasty merge of a Caucasian hospital with an African American hospital in North
Carolina to receive Medicare funding, and the overnight integration of blood supply to keep federal
funds).
243. Id. at 160.
244. Id. at 159-61.
245. David Barton Smith, Population Ecology and the Racial Integration of Hospitals and Nursing
Homes in the United States, 68 MILBANK Q. 561, 576 (1990).
246. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 161 (describing nursing homes' preference for out-of-pocket
payments to avoid participation in Medicare or Medicaid).
247. Id. at 249 ("[C]oncems about nursing-home minority access and discrimination were relegated
to periodic reports that collected dust."). See Ruqaiijah Yearby, Is It Too Late for Title VI
Enforcement?-Seeking Redemption of the Unequal United States' Long Term Care System Through
International Means, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 971, 993-94 (2005) (noting a 1987 report from the
United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, which discovered that
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priority was to initiate cutbacks in response to rising health care costs.24 8 The
government initiated cutbacks in the face of evidence that to achieve racial
integration of health care entities, such as nursing homes, the states needed to
increase reimbursement rates for Medicaid.249
Initially, the nursing home enforcement system did not fare much better. The
nursing home enforcement standards were so severe that only about twelve percent
of the 6,000 nursing homes that applied to participate in Medicaid were certified.25 °
Another fifty percent were designated as being in "substantial compliance" and
allowed to participate in the Medicaid program.25' In response to these
developments, Congress amended the Medicaid program in 1967, creating less
252rigorous enforcement standards for participation.
Since 1967, the nursing home enforcement system has been overhauled
several times. In 1974, the nursing home enforcement standards25 3 were changed to
allow a facility in violation of the regulations an opportunity to correct before the
imposition of termination. 54 To resolve nursing home violations, states were
mandated to send a notice of the violations to the facility and give the facility a
thirty- to sixty-day grace period to correct violations. 5 If the facility failed to
become compliant by the end of that time period, then and only then could the state
impose the sanction of terminating the Medicaid provider agreement.256
OCR "allowed discrimination to continue without federal intervention . . . and abdicated its
responsibility to ensure that HHS policies are consistent with civil rights law, among other things").
248. Smith, supra note 245, at 576-77.
249. See id. at 577 (indicating that achieving greater access to health care for African American
Medicaid patients would increase the costs of the program, straining participating health care entities).
250. INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE N NURSING HOMES 241 (1986).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 242; see also Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821
(regulating intermediate care facilities); Institutional Services in Intermediate Care Facilities, 34 Fed.
Reg. 9782, 9782-84 (June 24, 1969) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 234.130 (2009))
(implementing intermediate care facilities); Assistance in Form of Institutional Services in Intermediate
Care Facilities, 33 Fed. Reg. 12,925, 12,925-26 (Sept. 12, 1968) (presenting interim policies and
requirements for intermediate care facilities).
253. Skilled Nursing Facilities, 39 Fed. Reg. 2238, 2238-54 (Jan. 17, 1974). Under these
regulations, HHS created an office in the federal regional offices to regulate and oversee state
enforcement efforts of all long-term care facilities. INST. OF MED., supra note 250, at 245. Nevertheless,
many states chose not to implement or enforce these regulations. See id. at 245-46 (explaining that state
compliance varied widely among states even after the 1974 regulations).
254. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-87-113, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID:
STRONGER ENFORCEMENT OF NURSING HOME REQUIREMENTS NEEDED 23, 27-28 (1987).
255. INST. OF MED., supra note 250, at 148; see also Skilled Nursing Facilities, 39 Fed. Reg. at 2253
(requiring "a reasonable time to achieve compliance," and defining reasonable as within sixty days).
256. INST. OF MED., supra note 250, at 148; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
254, at 10.
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In 1980, Congress created an intermediate sanction, denial of payments for
new Medicaid admissions, for use in the nursing home enforcement system.
257
Nevertheless, a nursing home found out of compliance with the Medicaid
regulations was still given the opportunity to develop and implement a plan of
correction for its deficiencies before the imposition of the intermediate sanction.
258
If the facility was unable to fulfill the requirements set forth in the plan of
correction, the Secretary then had the right to impose the sanction of denial of
payments for new admissions.259 Prior to this change, termination was the only
remedy available to rectify violations of either the Title VI or the nursing home
enforcement systems.
Congress created this new process and sanction because HHS and the states
rarely imposed termination. It was anticipated that the intermediate sanction would
"serve to protect beneficiaries both by giving the skilled nursing facility an
incentive to correct deficiencies in a timely manner" without forcing HHS or the
states to shut down the nursing home.26° When the intermediate sanction was added
to the nursing home enforcement system, there was no mention of the need to add
an intermediate sanction to the Title VI enforcement system. Consequently,
because HHS rarely imposes termination in any instance, the failure to add an
intermediate sanction for Title VI violations left those violating Title VI without an
incentive to comply with Title VI.
In 1987, Congress passed the NHRA, dramatically changing the standards
and sanctions used in the nursing home enforcement system.26' Congress enacted a
set of standards that authorized HHS to aggressively police nursing homes through
the imposition of new sanctions (now called remedies), including denial of
payment for new admissions, civil money penalties, and temporary management.
262
Under the new nursing home enforcement system, nursing homes were no longer
provided an opportunity to voluntarily comply with the requirements before the
imposition of remedies.263
257. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 916, 94 Stat. 2599, 2623-25. These
remedies were imposed for violations that did not cause serious harm. Id.
258. H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 56 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5569.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 57. Congress recognized that states already had a full array of sanctions for Medicaid and
said that this rule would not pre-empt these sanctions. Id.
261. See discussion supra note 43.
262. H.R. REP. No. 100-391(1), at 475-77 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-
295 to -297. "Temporary management means the temporary appointment by [HHS] or the State of a
substitute facility manager or administrator with authority to hire, terminate or reassign staff, obligate
facility funds, alter facility procedures, and manage the facility to correct deficiencies identified in the
facility's operation." 42 C.F.R. § 488.415 (2009).
263. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL: CHAPTER 7-
SURVEY AND ENFORCEMENT PROCESS FOR SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES AND NURSING FACILITIES
§§ 7304, 7304C (2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/soml07c07.pdf
[hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM CH. 7].
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Incorporated into the Medicaid Act, the NHRA improved the quality of health
care provided in nursing homes. Although there is still work to be done, the current
nursing home enforcement system has improved the quality of care provided to
most residents. However, African Americans continue to disproportionately receive
poor quality care compared to Caucasians, due to governmental failures to enforce
Title VI.264
B. Current Nursing Home Enforcement System
Under the current nursing home enforcement system, HHS has delegated its
authority to the states and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS),2 65 a division of HHS. 26 6 The states administer the program by certifying
nursing homes to participate in Medicaid and reviewing their annual compliance
with the Medicaid Act.267 CMS then reviews the state's findings for accuracy;
however, it often defers to the state's findings.268
For example, to participate in Medicaid, a nursing home must enter into a
provider agreement with the state. 269 The state must conduct an initial survey and
certify the facility's compliance with the Medicaid conditions of participation for
nursing homes270 and with the civil rights regulations 271 before an agreement is
finalized.272 If a nursing home fulfills these requirements, the state will enter into a
Medicaid provider agreement with the nursing home.
After entering into a Medicaid provider agreement with the state, state
surveyors determine a nursing home's compliance with the Medicaid conditions of
participation 2 73 through the compliance review process called "survey and
264. See supra Part I.
265. In 1977, CMS, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), was
created to administer and regulate Medicaid. See Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Reorganization Order, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,262, 13,262 (Mar. 9, 1977) (establishing and authorizing the
HCFA to administer Medicaid and Medicare); Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; Statement of
Organization, Functions and Delegations of Authority; Reorganization Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,437,
35,437 (July 5, 2001) (renaming the HCFA as CMS). To prevent any confusion, this Article solely refers
to the agency as CMS.
266. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; Statement of Organization, Functions and
Delegations of Authority; Reorganization Order, 66 Fed. Reg. at 35,437.
267. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL: CHAPTER I-
PROGRAM BACKGROUND AND RESPONSIBILITIES §§ 1002, 1004 (2004), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/soml07c01.pdf (hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., SOM CH. 1]. For State operated nursing homes, CMS has the responsibility for
certifying nursing homes to participate in Medicaid and reviews their annual compliance with the
Medicaid Act. Id. § 1008B. Usually, CMS determinations are based on State survey findings. Id. § 1006.
268. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM CH. 7, supra note 263, §§ 7807A, 7807B.
269. 42 C.F.R. § 442.12(a) (2009).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 442.12(d)(2).
272. Id.
273. Id. § 488.300.
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certification." 274 The purpose of the conditions of participation is to ensure that
residents of nursing homes receive quality physical and mental care, by
establishing participation standards to protect the patient's rights and health
status.275 Nursing homes certified to participate in Medicaid are required to fulfill
the conditions of participation for all residents, regardless of the payment status of
the resident.276
State surveyors use fifteen conditions of participation to review the
compliance of nursing homes with the Medicaid Act.277 These conditions include:
resident rights,27 8 resident behavior,27 9 quality of life, 80 resident assessment,28 '
quality of care,282 nursing services, 283 dietary services,284 physician services,
2s 5
rehabilitative services,286 dental services,287 pharmacy services, 288 infection
control,289 administration,29° admission and transfer rights,29' and physical
environment. 292 Under the current survey and certification process, once a nursing
home is certified to participate in Medicaid, the home is visited every nine to
fifteen months293 by a state health agency survey team 294 often comprised of nurses,
274. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(1) (2006 & West Supp. 2009); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300-.335 (Subpart E-
Survey & Certification of Long-Term Care Facilities). HHS requires that the states develop a survey
plan to that complies with the requirements of 42 C.F.R. subpts. E-F. 42 C.F.R. § 488.303(a). Under this
plan, the states may establish a program to reward, through public recognition or incentive payments (or
both) nursing homes that provide the highest quality of care to Medicaid residents. Id. § 488.303(b).
275. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Conditions for
Coverage (CfCs) & Conditions of Participations (CoPs): Overview,
http://www.cms.gov/CFCsAndCoPs/ (last visited June 14, 2010).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(4)(A) (making no distinction between the payment statuses of individual
residents).
277. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1(b), .10-75. Because both the federal government and the states provide
funding for Medicaid certified nursing homes, the regulation of these homes incorporates both federal
and state law. Furthermore, if a nursing home is certified to participate in both Medicare and Medicaid,
it must meet the requirements and undergo the regulation processes of both programs. CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM CH. 1, supra note 267, §§ 1000, 1OOOB, 1002.
278. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10.
279. Id. § 483.13.
280. Id. § 483.15.
281. Id. § 483.20.
282. Id. § 483.25.
283. Id. § 483.30.
284. Id. § 483.35.
285. Id. § 483.40.
286. Id. § 483.45.
287. Id. § 483.55.
288. Id. § 483.60.
289. Id. § 483.65.
290. Id. § 483.75.
291. Id. § 483.12.
292. Id. § 483.70.
293. See id. § 488.308 (requiring an average interval of twelve months between surveys and no later
than fifteen months after the previous survey). This survey is called an annual standard survey. A
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nutritionists, social workers, and physical therapists. 295 The survey team assesses
whether the nursing home continues to be in compliance with the Medicaid
conditions of participation, which are a compilation of federal and state laws.
296
The survey and certification process is different in each state, but generally
includes several steps.297 Before entering the facility, the survey team reviews
numerous documents, including but not limited to the resident assessment
instrument (RAI),295 the facility quality measures and indicators,299 and the
facility's historical compliance data.30 0 The team uses these documents to
determine the facility's past and current compliance with the Medicaid conditions
of participation.30 1 After reviewing the data, the survey team conducts an entrance
conference with the nursing home administrator. The team then conducts an initial
tour of the facility to: "[p]rovide an initial review of the facility, the residents, and
the staff; [o]btain an initial evaluation of the environment of the facility, including
the facility kitchen; and [c]onfirm or invalidate the pre-selected concems, if any,
and add concems discovered onsite.32 After the initial tour, the surveyors select at
random a group of residents for an in-depth review of their care as provided by the
nursing home.30 3 The review includes medical record reviews, observations of
standard survey is "a periodic, resident-centered inspection [that] gathers information about the quality
of service furnished in a facility to determine compliance with the requirements for participation." Id.
§ 488.301. There are three other types of surveys: abbreviated, validation, and extended standard survey.
Id. An abbreviated standard survey is "a survey other than a standard survey that gathers information
primarily through resident-centered techniques on facility compliance with the requirements for
participation." Id. An extended standard survey is "a survey that evaluates additional participation
requirements subsequent to finding substandard quality of care during a standard survey." Id. A
validation survey is "a survey conducted by the Secretary [of HHS] within [two] months following a
standard survey, abbreviated standard survey, partial extended survey, or extended survey for the
purpose of monitoring State survey agency performance." Id. Although named differently, the
compliance requirements are the same.
294. Id. § 488.305.
295. Id. § 488.314.
296. See id. § 482.23 (stating that nursing services' conditions of participation are a compilation of
federal and state laws); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL: APPENDIX P-SURVEY PROTOCOL FOR LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITIES PART I, at pt. 1 (2009), available at http://cms.hhs.gov/manuals/Downloads/
soml07ap-p-ltcf pdf [hereinafter CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM APP. P] (explaining
that the survey relies on sampling of residents to gather information about the facility's compliance with
participation requirements).
297. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM APP. P, supra note 296, pt. I (showing there
are several steps in the survey and certification process, and describing those steps).
298. 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b). The resident assessment instrument (RAI) is coded and transmitted to
the minimum data set (MDS). Id. § 483.20(o.
299. The facility quality measures and indicators are based on information from the data from the
MDS. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM APP. P, supra note 296, pt. II.B.I.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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direct resident care, resident interviews, family interviews, and observations of
events such as activities and meals.304 The surveyor team members then meet to
discuss their findings and determine the nursing homes compliance with the
Medicaid conditions of participation.
30 5
For the final step in the survey process, the survey team meets with the
administrative staff and shares its preliminary findings. If the survey team finds the
nursing home out of compliance with the Medicaid conditions of participation, it
cites the facility for a deficiency and shares this information with the administrative
staff.30 6 After the meeting, the survey team drafts a Statement of Deficiencies
(SOD) detailing the nursing home's noncompliance and factual incidents to support
these allegations.3 °7 The state's findings of noncompliance are final, except in the
308case of a state-operated, Medicaid-only nursing home.
In the SOD, each deficiency is assigned a scope and severity level based on
the egregiousness of the offense. 30 9 The scope is the number of residents affected
and the severity level refers to the seriousness of the harm.3t ° The scope and
severity of each deficiency assigned is based on the matrix shown below in Table 1.
304. Id. pt. II.A.I.
305. Id. pt. II.BI.
306. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 113, at 1. There are a total of 190 possible deficiencies
based on the fifteen conditions of participation, for which the states can cite a nursing home. Id. Most
deficiencies are categorized into three main areas: quality of care, 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2009), quality of
life, id. § 483.15, and resident behavior and facility practice, id. § 483.13.
307. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.402(f)(1) (describing the notification requirements for the facility). The
state submits its findings on the HHS Online Survey Certification and Reporting system for HHS
approval. Id. §§ 488.330(d), .402(0(1); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. OEl-02-98-00330, NURSING HOME SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION: OVERALL
CAPACITY 10 (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-98-00330.pdf (noting that the
Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) database is where all state survey information is
stored). Upon approval from HHS, the State agency sends a copy of the SOD to the offending nursing
home along with a letter noting all the remedies imposed. §§ 488.18(b)(1), .402(0(2)(ii). Even after
HHS approves the SOD, nursing homes can appeal any deficiencies or remedies through an informal
dispute resolution process. Id. § 488,331. "Reductions in the number, scope, and severity of citations are
common." Robert H. Lee et al., Reliability of the Nursing Home Survey Process: A Simultaneous Survey
Approach, 46 THE GERONTOLOGIST 772, 773 (2006).
308. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE& MEDICAID SERVS., SOM CH. l,supra note 267, § 1016.
309. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.404 (requiring the seriousness to be described in levels of"[a]ctual harm"
and the scope to be described in terms of whether the deficiencies "(i) [a]re isolated; (ii) (c]onstitute a
pattern; or (iii) [a]re widespread").
310. Id. § 488.404(b).
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TABLE 1: SCOPE AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAID DEFICIENCIES 3 11
Severity Scope
Isolated 3 12  Pattern 3
13  Widespread 3 14
Immediate jeopardy to resident health/safety 15  J K L
Actual harm that is not immediate jeopardy' 16  G H I
No actual harm with potential for more than
minimal harm that is not immediate jeopardy 317  D E F
No actual harm with a potential for minimal
harm3 18  A B C
311. Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to
Kerry Weems, Acting Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Sept. 18, 2008), at 3 fig.l,
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-08-00140.pdf.
312. "Scope is isolated when one or a very limited number of residents are affected and/or one or a
very limited number of staff are involved, and/or the situation has occurred only occasionally or in a
very limited number of locations." CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM APP. P, supra note
296, pt. IV.C.
313.
Scope is a pattern when more than a very limited number of residents are affected, and/or
more than a very limited number of staff are involved, and/or the situation has occurred in
several locations, and/or the same resident(s) have been affected by repeated occurrences of
the same deficient practice. The effect of the deficient practice is not found to be pervasive
throughout the facility.
Id. pt. IV.C.
314.
Scope is widespread when the problems causing the deficiencies are pervasive in the facility
and/or represent systemic failure that affected or has the potential to affect a large portion or
all of the facility's residents. Widespread scope refers to the entire facility population, not a
subset of residents or one unit of a facility. In addition, widespread scope may be identified if
a systemic failure in the facility (e.g., failure to maintain food at safe temperatures) would be
likely to affect a large number of residents and is, therefore, pervasive in the facility.
Id. pt. IV.C.
315. "Immediate jeopardy means a situation in which the provider's noncompliance with one or
more requirements of participation has caused, or is likely to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or
death to a resident." 42 C.F.R. § 488.301.
316. CMS defines this level of severity as:
[N]oncompliance that results in a negative outcome that has compromised the resident's
ability to maintain and/or reach his/her highest practicable physical, mental and psychosocial
well-being as defined by an accurate and comprehensive resident assessment, plan of care,
and provision of services. This does not include a deficient practice that only could or has
caused limited consequence to the resident.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM APP. P, supra note 296, pt. IV.B.
317. CMS defines this level of severity as:
[Nioncompliance that results in no more than minimal physical, mental and/or psychosocial
discomfort to the resident and/or has the potential (not yet realized) to compromise the
resident's ability to maintain and/or reach his/her highest practicable physical, mental and/or
psychosocial well-being as defined by an accurate and comprehensive resident assessment,
plan of care, and provision of services.
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Remedies can be imposed for any nursing home that is not in substantial
compliance; 319 however, customarily, remedies are only imposed for nursing homes
that have deficiencies at a scope and severity level greater than A. 320 The greater
the scope and severity of the deficiencies, the more likely the government will
impose remedies.3 ' Other factors considered in the selection of remedies are the
relationship of the deficiencies resulting in noncompliance and the facility's prior
history of noncompliance, both generally and specifically in reference to the current
deficiencies. 322 If the states or CMS decide to impose remedies, there are three
categories n3 of available remedies.
324
These three categories of remedies include plan of correction, state
monitoring, directed in-service training, denial of payment for new admissions,
denial of payment for all individuals, 32 5 a per day civil money penalty (CMP) of
318. CMS defines this level of severity as "a deficiency that has the potential for causing no more
than a minor negative impact on the resident(s)." Id.
319. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.408(c). Both HHS and the states have the authority to impose remedies for
noncompliance. Id. The states impose remedies for violations of Medicaid conditions of participation.
Id. § 488.330(e)(1). The types of remedies by states vary, but are based on the remedies imposed for
violations of the Medicare conditions of participation. States can add additional remedies, such as
directed plan of correction or directed in-service training. Id. § 488.408(c).
320. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM CH. 7, supra note 263, §§ 7304D, 7400E
(noting that unless the deficiencies are at a scope and level A, the facility will be asked to submit a plan
of correction to determine whether there is substantial compliance). Every facility is required to submit a
plan of correction for deficiencies greater than a scope and severity of A. Id. A plan of correction is a
remedy. Id.
321. 42 C.F.R. § 488.404.
322. Id. § 488.404(c).
323. If a facility has deficiencies rated at D or E, then HHS or the states must impose a Category I
remedy. Id. § 488.408(c)(2). Category I remedies include directed plan of correction, state monitoring,
and directed in-service training. Id. § 488.408(c)(1). If a facility has deficiencies rated at F, G, or H, then
HHS or the states must impose a Category 2 remedy. Id. § 488.408(d)(2). Category 2 remedies include
denial of payment for new admissions, denial of payment for all individuals, per day a civil money
penalty (CMP) of $50 to $3,000, and per instance CMP of $1,000 to $10,000. Id. § 488.408(d)(1). Only
HHS can impose denial of payment for all individuals. Id. § 488.408(d)(1)(ii). If a facility has
deficiencies rated at I, HHS or the states may impose temporary management, in addition to Category 2
remedies. Id. § 488.408(e)(3). When the facility has one or more deficiencies rated at J, K, or L, HHS or
the states must do one or both of the following: impose temporary management or terminate the
Medicaid provider agreement. Id. § 488.408(e)(2)(i). Additionally, HHS or the states may impose a per
day CMP of $3,050 to $10,000 or a per instance CMP of $1,000 to $10,000. Id. § 488.408(e)(2)(ii).
324. Id. § 488.408(b). HHS mandates that states establish remedies besides the termination of the
provider agreement for non-state operated Medicaid nursing homes. Id. § 488.303(d). These remedies
include temporary management, denial of payment for new admissions, CMPs, transfer of residents,
closure of the facility and transfer of residents, and state monitoring. Id. In addition to these remedies,
the states may impose directed plan of correction, directed in-service training, or alternative state-
created remedies. Id. § 488.303(e). If the state creates alternative remedies, it must specify those
remedies in its Medicaid plan and demonstrate to the satisfaction of HHS that the "alternative remedies
are as effective in deterring noncompliance and correcting deficiencies as the [other] remedies . I..." Id.
§ 488.303(0. Most states use the same remedies provided for under the Medicare Act.
325. Id. §§ 488.408(c)(1), d(l), e(l). Only HHS can impose this remedy. Id. § 488.408(d)(1)(ii).
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$50 to $10,000, a per-instance CMP of $1,000 to $10,000,326 temporary
management, and termination of the Medicaid provider agreement.327 The factors
used to determine the amount of the CMP, include the facility's history of
noncompliance (both generally and specifically in reference to the current
deficiencies), whether the facility has repeated deficiencies, the relationship of the
deficiencies resulting in noncompliance, the facility's culpability,328 and the
facility's financial conditions.
329
In addition to the imposition of remedies, the state reports to CMS, 330 the state
nursing home ombudsman, the physicians that work at the nursing home, the state
skilled nursing facility administration licensing board, and the state Medicaid fraud
and abuse control units.33' CMS uses the states' findings to compile a quality
rating, which is posted on the CMS Nursing Home Compare website. 332 The
Nursing Home Compare website provides information regarding the overall quality
of Medicaid certified nursing homes.333 A nursing home's overall quality rating is
based on information from the State's survey and certification reports and
information submitted by the nursing home.334
Decisions made during the survey and certification process significantly
affect nursing home behavior, and thus, will be useful in the fight against racial
discrimination. For instance, according to Professor Robert Lee, the "Nursing
Home Compare" website "is the nation's second most popular nursing home care
site and is one of the most frequently visited sections of the [HHS] Web site. 335
This information is also used by U.S. News & World Report to publish a ranking of
326. Id. § 488.408(d)(l)(iii)-(iv).
327. Id. § 488.408(e)(I)(i)-(ii), (e)(2)(i).
328. Id. § 488.438(f). "Culpability ... includes, but is not limited to, neglect, indifference, or
disregard for resident care, comfort or safety. The absence of culpability is not a mitigating circumstance
in reducing the amount of the penalty." Id. § 488.438()(4).
329. Id. § 488.438(f)(2).
330. The state enters the findings from the SOD into the CMS OSCAR database, which is available
to the public. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nursing
Home Quality Initiatives, http://www.cms.gov/NursingHomeQualitylnits/ (last visited June 14, 2010)
(making the findings available online).
331. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(5) (2006).
332. See id. § 1395i-3(g)(5) (requiring the publication of information from the surveys of nursing
facilities). The information remains posted until the next annual survey is conducted.
333. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 330.
334. Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nursing Home
Compare, http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/Home.asp (last visited June 14, 2010). The quality
rating of Medicaid certified nursing homes is based on three categories: health inspections, staffing
levels, and quality measures. Id. (follow "Five-Star Quality Rating" hyperlink). The health inspection
rating is based on information from state surveys. Id. The staffing level rating is based on information
from state surveys and information submitted by the nursing homes. Id. The quality measure rating is
based on information submitted by the nursing home from the MDS. Id.
335. Lee et al., supra note 307, at 779.
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America's best nursing homes336 and by insurance companies to determine yearly
hazard insurance premiums for nursing homes.3 7
The nursing home enforcement system is by no means perfect. Patient groups
allege that survey teams miss deficiencies, while nursing home owners "argue that
the current survey and enforcement system 'is an entirely subjective, process-
oriented snapshot inspection system that focuses on punishment-not quality
improvement.' 338 Furthermore, in 2004, the Government Accountability Office
reported testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance to the fact that "the
magnitude of serious deficiencies that harmed nursing home residents remains
unacceptably high, despite some decline." 339 Unlike Title VI enforcement,
however, the problems of the nursing home enforcement system were not related to
a lack of funding or lax enforcement. These deficiencies were a result of
"insufficient and inexperienced survey staff, confusion about the regulations,
inadequate state oversight of the survey process, and the predictable timing of
surveys."
340
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the nursing home enforcement system,
the Secretary and the states are actually investigating allegations of noncompliance
and imposing remedies for noncompliance findings compared to allegations of
Title VI violations.34' In 2004, 3,159 federal and state CMPs were collected for a
total of $21.6 million dollars. 342 As of 2009, no nursing home has been sanctioned
for findings of noncompliance with Title VI.34 3 Therefore, I argue that the
336. U.S. News & World Report, Best Nursing Homes Plus Assisted Living Facilities,
http://health.usnews.com/senior-housing (last visited June 14, 2010).
337. Currently in many states, such as Texas, Florida, and Illinois, many nursing homes are forced to
operate without insurance or go out of business because insurance companies are unwilling to offer
nursing homes with less than perfect compliance histories reasonable insurance rates. See Kendall
Anderson, Nursing Homes Pay Premium to Survive: Soaring Liability Costs Blamed for Closure of
Nonprofit Care Centers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2002, at 21A (describing nursing homes in
Texas that were forced to close due to "skyrocketing liability insurance premiums").
338. Lee et al., supra note 307, at 772. "An ongoing concern for... [the various] stakeholders is that
the number of deficiencies varies substantially between states." Id.
339. U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-03-1016T, NURSING HOMES: PREVALENCE OF
SERIOUS QUALITY PROBLEMS REMAINS UNACCEPTABLY HIGH, DESPITE SOME DECLINE 2 (2003)
(statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir., Health Care Issues Before the Senate Committee on Finance),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031016t.pdf.
340. Lee et al., supra note 307, at 772. "Surveyors question the integrity of the inspection, political
pressures to water down inspection findings, and the effectiveness of the enforcement process." 1d.
341. See Charlene Harrington et al., Variation in the Use of Federal and State Civil Money Penalties
for Nursing Homes, 48 THE GERONTOLOGIST 679, 684 tbl.2 (2008) (reporting the 2004 CMPs imposed
by HHS and states for noncompliance); Yearby, supra note 8, at 433, 474-75 (discussing the lack of
Title VI enforcement).
342. See Harrington et al., supra note 341, at 684 tbl.2.
343. See Yearby, supra note 8, at 474-75 (showing that complaints are resolved through voluntary
commitments to cease and desist discriminatory practices, rather than official Title VI sanctions).
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integration of civil rights nursing with the nursing home enforcement system can be
used to put an end to racial inequities.
C. Addressing Access and Quality Inequities Through the Nursing Home
Enforcement System
Since 1965, nursing homes have improved the quality of care provided
residents, while nursing homes never fully racially integrated or actively sought
African American patients. 344 Because government agencies charged with the
responsibility of enforcing civil rights laws have neglected their duties, in this
sector, the time has come to invigorate Title VI enforcement by integrating it into
the nursing home enforcement system.
For example, Medicaid conditions of participation include requirements for
admission policies.345 The conditions prohibit racial discrimination or exploitation
of Medicaid patients solely based on their payment status. 346 As discussed in Part
II, neither the Secretary nor the states enforce this condition and regulate the
admissions practices of nursing homes.347 Thus, nursing homes remain free to
admit and deny whoever they choose, which empirical evidence shows is often
linked to race.
The Medicaid admission requirements, however, do provide that "States or
political subdivisions may apply stricter admissions standards under State or local
laws than are specified in th[e] [HHS regulation], to prohibit discrimination against
individuals entitled to Medicaid. '348 I suggest that states use this authority to
require nursing homes to submit yearly reports regarding the race of all patients
who sought admission to the nursing home, including those denied admission.
Like Tennessee, every state should require nursing homes to develop and
maintain a public waiting list of persons requesting admission to the nursing
home. 349 This information should be submitted to the State as part of the nursing
homes survey and certification process.35 ° If the nursing home's admission report
shows a trend in denial of admission based on race, this information should be
344. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 243, 264-67 (indicating that although Medicare and Medicaid
have dramatically increased federal funding of health care since 1965, nursing homes remain highly
segregated). The only change was the removal of blatant discriminatory advertising. Id. at 236.
345. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d) (2009).
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(4)(A) (2006 & West. Supp. 2009) (prohibiting nursing homes from
establishing and maintaining separate policies regarding transfer, discharge, and the provision of
services).
347. See supra Part 1I.B.2.
348. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(4).
349. TENN. CoMp. R. & REGS. 1200-13-01-.08 (2009).
350. Although this will not address steering by hospital discharge planners, it will begin to address
race based admission decisions made by nursing homes.
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published on the Nursing Home Compare website.351 Additionally, HHS should
impose remedies.
I also suggest that when the survey team visits a nursing home it should also
monitor the quality of care provided based on race. Compliance with Title VI is not
a condition of participation.352 Nevertheless, the purpose of the Medicaid
conditions of participation, which includes ensuring that residents of nursing homes
receive quality care, is inextricably tied to race. 353 Studies show that the lower
quality of care provided to elderly African Americans is due to racial inequities.
354
Thus, by limiting compliance with the conditions of participation to issues of
quality and payment, the Secretary and the states have missed a significant factor
that causes noncompliance: race.
To comply with the purpose of the Medicaid conditions of participation, the
Secretary and the states should incorporate a review of nursing homes' compliance
with the Medicaid conditions of participation, together with racial inequities in
nursing home care. Incorporating a review of racial inequities will not impose an
additional administrative burden on surveyors, because they already collect racial
data.
A nursing home is required to complete a RAI for all patients upon admission
and whenever there is significant change in the resident's condition.35 5 The form
also includes information about the resident's race. 356 This information is recorded
on the RAI is coded and transmitted to the minimum data set (MDS). 357 The MDS
information is used to compile reports, such as the facility quality measure
351. To determine if the nursing home is discriminating in admissions, the waiting list will have to
be compared to the medical records of patients admitted to the nursing home. If those on the waiting list
who are minorities remain on the list, while Caucasians are admitted, then this supports a finding of
discrimination.
352. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.75(c) (explaining that although additional nondiscrimination "regulations
are not in themselves considered requirements . . . , their violation may result in the termination or
suspension of... [flederal funds").
353. Yearby, supra note 247, at 986.
354. SMITH, supra note 12, at 265-67.
355. 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b).
The nursing home quality measures come from resident assessment data that nursing homes
routinely collect on the residents at specified intervals during their stay. These measures
assess the resident's physical and clinical conditions and abilities, as well as preferences and
life care wishes. These assessment data have been converted to develop quality measures that
give consumers another source of information that shows how well nursing homes are caring
for their resident's physical and clinical needs.
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Quality Measures Nursing
Home Quality Initiatives, http://www.cms.gov/NursingHomeQualitylnitsl10.NHQ1Quality
Measures.asp (last visited June 14, 2010).
356. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b)(i) (detailing the requirements of the resident assessment instrument,
including the patient's demographic information).
357. Id. § 483.20(f). MDS data is recorded in the MDS Repository and available to the public, so
long as that information is not resident-identifiable. Id. § 483.20(f(5)(i).
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indicator report, which are used during the survey and certification process to
determine whether the care provided to individual residents conforms to the
358Medicaid requirements. In addition to using the MDS to compile facility quality
measure and indicator reports, I suggest that the state's use the race information in
the MDS to track individual patient care based on race. If the care provided to
minorities does not meet the requirements of Medicaid, then the nursing home
should be cited for noncompliance and fined.
In addition to this review of individual patient's care, I recommend that the
government track the care given to different racial groups by using race information
in the MDS to link quality with race. The team should collect and review racial
data of current and past residents to compare the quality of care provided African
American and Caucasian patients residing in the same facility. 359 Each time a
facility is found to provide disproportionately poor care to African Americans, it
should be cited for violating Medicaid and fined. To avoid fines and public
humiliation, nursing homes would have to equalize the quality of care provided to
African Americans.
The survey team can accomplish this goal by simply using the same
regulations and citing the nursing home if the care provided is poor for minorities,
such as African Americans. Not only does this fit within the requirements of
current regulations concerning quality, it is also consistent with the spirit of the
Medicaid Act, which explicitly mandates the government to provide medical
assistance to elderly individuals who qualify for Medicaid in the same "amount,
duration, or scope.., made available to any other such individual. 3 6 °
If the racial inequity in the provision of care was such that African Americans
were harmed then the nursing home should be cited for actual harm. For example, a
study showed that late-stage pressure sores are more common to African
Americans, while early stage pressure sores are more common to Caucasians.361
The higher rates of late-stage pressure sores in African Americans are because they
are commonly underdiagnosed. 362 Thus, Caucasians receive treatment before the
pressure sore becomes too severe, while African Americans and other minorities
suffer without treatment until the pressure sore becomes irreparable.363 This is a
358. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SOM APP. P, supra note 296, pts. 1, II.B. I. During
the survey and certification process, the states use an RAI to check the nursing home's MDS
information for errors. Id.
359. Because data of race have just become available, it may take time to obtain enough data to
compare past and current residents.
360. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(I0)(B)(i) (2006).
361. Fennell et al., supra note 6, at 175-76.
362. Id. at 176.
363. See id. (inferring that because African Americans suffer from disproportionately greater late-
stage pressure sores, they are not receiving as immediate care as Caucasian patients in the same
condition). Note that pressure sores can cause a variety of complications if left untreated, such as
infection to the blood, heart, and bones; amputation; prolonged bedrest; or death. See DEP'T OF REHAB.
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perfect example of actual harm suffered unequally by African American nursing
home residents. The nursing home should be cited for a F, G, or H deficiency and
should be fined between $50 to $3,000 per day or $1,000 to $10,000 per
instance.36 In addition to fines, the information should be posted on the Nursing
Home Compare website.
When African Americans are seriously harmed, such as being hospitalized
due to poor care, the nursing home should be cited for immediate jeopardy. A
recent study found that African American nursing home residents were more likely
than Caucasian residents to be hospitalized for "dehydration, poor nutrition,
bedsores, and other aliments because of a gap in the quality of in-house medical
care" in nursing homes.3 65 This is a perfect example of an immediate jeopardy
situation and in which African Americans unequally suffer serious harm. The
nursing home should be cited for a J, K, or L deficiency and fined for these
deficiencies should range between $3,050 to $10,000 per day or $1,000 to $10,000
per instance.366 In addition to fines, the information should be posted on the
Nursing Home Compare website. To avoid fines and public humiliation, nursing
homes would have to equalize the quality of care provided to African Americans.
Some may argue that it will be too difficult to link poor outcomes with race.
However, when surveyors review the care provided by a nursing home to residents
they are able to determine whether the poor outcomes were unavoidable. Thus, the
surveyors will only have to look at the resident's race and determine whether
African American residents suffer more avoidable poor outcomes when compared
with Caucasian residents.
Additionally, some may argue that there is no way to track racial inequities in
the quality of care when there is low racial mix in residents. This concern can be
alleviated. Currently, when inspecting nursing homes, the government determines
nursing home deficiencies based on all the nursing homes in the country and all
nursing homes in the state in which the nursing home is located.367 If the federal
government uses the racial classification information found in the MIDS, then it will
have national and state racial inequity data.368 Even if the nursing home only has a
small number of African American residents there will be a national and state
standard of care based on race that can be used to determine whether these nursing
MED., UNIV. OF WASH. MED. CTR., TAKING CARE OF PREssuRE SORES (2007), available at
http://sci.washington.edu/info/pamphlets/takecare..pressuresores.pdf (listing symptoms and
complications caused by pressure sores).
364. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
365. Spinner, supra note 123.
366. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
367. See generally Medicare.gov, Nursing Homes: About Nursing Home Inspections,
http://www.medicare.gov/nursing/Aboutlnspections.asp (last visited June 14, 2010) (indicating that state
officials conduct inspections an average of once per year to determine whether nursing homes within
their state comply with minimum national standards under Medicare and Medicaid).
368. See supra notes 355-57 and accompanying text.
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homes should be cited for providing poor quality care. If so, they should be
sanctioned accordingly.
As Professors Sara Rosenbaum and Joel Teitelbaum note, "it no longer makes
sense to divide the world of enforcement when the overall goal is the systemic
improvement of program performance., 369 By integrating these systems, the
government "would make clear that a particular practice is desirable not only
because it improves the racial equality of programs but also because it improves the
quality of health care for persons who are the intended beneficiaries of the
programs., 370 This is further supported by the seminal Institute of Medicine study,
Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care,
371
that stated "[b]y establishing both racial equality and program quality improvement
as two inextricably linked goals.., the federal government would immeasurably
strengthen its hand in the setting of prospective standards of conduct.,
372
There are several approaches one could take to induce the government to
integrate these systems. One approach is administrative. African Americans could
pursue a petition for rulemaking to require HHS to integrate investigations of racial
inequities with the current survey and certification process. Another approach
would be more politically oriented and use grassroots or lobbying efforts, to force
Congress to revise the NHRA to include enforcement of civil rights complaints.
Yet, another approach would be litigation. African Americans could file class
action lawsuits against the Secretary and the states for violating the Medicaid Act's
"reasonable promptness" provision and the NHRA's requirements that a nursing
home to provide quality care. Because Congress and HHS have focused on bigger
issues such as economic recovery and universal health care coverage,373 in my
opinion the administrative and political approaches do not seem feasible.
374
Therefore, in this Article I will focus exclusively on the last option: the class action
suit.
369. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 250.
370. Id.
371. See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 9, at 285-89 app. B (describing the study and how it
was performed).
372. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 250.
373. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhom & Robert Pear, While Confident Health Care Will Pass This
Year, Democrats Still Search for a Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at All (describing recent
congressional focus on the economy and health care).
374. There has been no mention of civil rights concerning racial disparities in health care by the
Obama Administration. The only discussion regarding civil rights enforcement has focused on voting
rights, housing, employment, bank lending practices, and redistricting after the 2010 census. See Charlie
Savage, White House to Shift Efforts on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at Al (noting that that
the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department is focusing on voting rights, housing, and hiring as
part of "a major revival of high-impact civil rights enforcement against policies ... where statistics
show that minorities fare disproportionately poorly").
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IV. USING THE MEDICAID ACT TO TRANSFORM THE SYSTEM
Most nursing homes now participate in the Medicaid program, and evidence
shows that significant racial inequities in the provision of care due to racial
discrimination persist. 375 Therefore, it seems reasonable to use compliance with the
Medicaid Act and the NHRA as a means to rectify unequal quality of care provided
African Americans when compared to Caucasians. Specifically, elderly African
Americans and their advocates should file injunctive and declaratory § 1983
claims 3 76 asserting that the Secretary and the states have violated the Medicaid Act
and the NHRA.
377
Each case requires the certification of a class.378 The first class would include
African Americans who were delayed transfer or denied admission. This class
would assert that the states and Secretary have failed to fulfill the mandates of the
Medicaid Act's "reasonable promptness" provision, which requires that Medicaid
patients receive reasonably prompt medical assistance and includes nursing home
care.3 79 The second class would include African Americans who received poor
quality care and challenge the Secretary and the states compliance with the
NHRA's requirements for nursing homes, which mandates that the states and
Secretary ensure that nursing homes provide residents with quality nursing care.
3 80
Before courts review the substance of either case, African Americans will
have to show that there is a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
fulfilling the test established in Blessing v. Freestone.38 1 Several circuits have
375. Mor et al., supra note 25, at 237-38; see Avery Comarow, Best Nursing Homes: Behind the
Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 2010, http://health.usnews.com/articles/health/best-
nursing-homes/2010/01/ll/best-nursing-homes-behind-the-rankings.html (noting nearly all nursing
homes today participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs).
376. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any statute ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress .... ).
377. Violations of the NHRA are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Grammer v. John J.
Kane Reg'l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 522, 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2009) (ruling that the NHRA, 42
U.S.C. § 1396r, provided a private right of action under § 1983).
378. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b) (describing the prerequisite for certifying a class and the types of
class action suits).
379. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), (10) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
380. See 1d. §§ 1396r(b)(l)(A) (requiring that a nursing facility provide care consistent with the
maintenance or enhancement of its patients' quality of life).
381. See 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). The Court in Blessing held that plaintiffs seeking redress
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must assert the violation of a federal right, as opposed to merely the violation
of federal law. Id. at 340. The Court required that the plaintiff demonstrate the presence of three factors:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not
so 'vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.
Id. (citations onitted).
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already ruled that Medicaid's "reasonable promptness" provision provides a private
right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, applying this test.382 The Third Circuit, the
only court that has ruled on the right to sue under the specific NHRA section
discussed in this Article, ruled that the NHRA provides a private right of action.383
Based on past precedent, the courts should review the substance of both cases.384
To win the case and obtain an injunction, plaintiffs still must show that they
have suffered irreparable harm based on the empirical evidence specific to their
state.385 Unlike other civil rights cases, in the proposed litigation proof of specific
instances of delays, denials of admission, and disparities in quality by specific
nursing homes due to disparate treatment is unnecessary because this case is based
on the systematic failures of the Secretary and the states to devise a system that
allows for Medicaid patients to attain reasonably prompt access to quality nursing
home care. Thus, to have standing a class of plaintiffs must show that they have
been denied reasonably prompt access to quality nursing homes by providing
empirical data regarding the delays experienced by other state residents as was used
in Linton ex rel, Arnold v. Commissioner of Health & Environment.386 Currently,
the only states that have detailed empirical research regarding delays and denials of
admission are North Carolina and New York.387 Yet, there is already clear and
convincing national and state data that there are racial disparities in admission to
and the provision of quality nursing home care.388
Furthermore, to obtain an equitable remedy such as injunctive relief, the
plaintiffs must show that they will win on the merits of the case. 389 Based on case
precedent, the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits. Over the last thirty years,
Medicaid patients have filed a number of § 1983 claims to challenge racial
382. See cases cited supra note 51.
383. Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'I Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 522, 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2009).
384. See Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2007) (ruling that there was a private right of
action under § 1983 in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)
(ruling that there was a private right of action under § 1983 in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)); Sabree ex rel.
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an analysis based upon other cases
"compels the conclusion that the provisions invoked by plaintiffs-42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8),
1396a(a)(I 0), and 1396d(a)(15)-unambiguously confer rights vindicable under § 1983").
385. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008)).
386. 779 F. Supp. 925, 927-28, 935-36 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). In Linton, the class of plaintiffs sought
to enjoin a Tennessee policy, which allowed nursing homes to limit the number of beds used for
Medicaid patients. Id. at 927. The Court held that the plaintiffs possessed the requisite standing because
they were able to prove that the policy had a disparate impact on minorities. Id. at 932.
387. See Yearby, supra note 8, at 457 n.181 (noting that, as of 2007, only North Carolina and New
York have shown that African Americans experience delays in transfer to quality nursing homes due to
their race).
388. See supra Part 1.B-C.
389. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 572 F.3d at 651.
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inequities and quality of care violations in nursing home care. 390 In a majority of
the cases, the plaintiffs were able to force the Secretary and the states to implement
new rules and regulations to address racial inequities and quality of care
violations.
39
'
Filing cases such as these can be timely and costly.392 Though they will not
eliminate all of the race-based decision-making that pervades the nursing home
system, this may be the best option to induce the Secretary and the states to
significantly improve the quality of nursing home care for all African Americans
compared to the infinitesimal gains made when individual complainants prevail.
A. Private Right ofAction Under § 1983
In order to bring a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show that they fulfill the
standard announced in Blessing.393 The Blessing standard requires that: 1) Congress
intended to confer a benefit on the plaintiff; 2) "the right. . . is not so 'vague and
amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence;" and 3) the
statue unambiguously imposes a mandatory binding obligation on the states.394 The
Supreme Court further refined the language of the first prong of Blessing in
Gonzaga University v. Doe,395 requiring that there be explicit rights creating
language in the statute in question.396 If a plaintiff fulfills the requirements of the
refined Blessing test, there is a presumption that the plaintiff has a private right of
action under § 1983. 397 The government can overcome this presumption if it can
show that Congress created a comprehensive administrative scheme that is
incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.398 When applying the
390. E.g., In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1984); Taylor v. White, 132
F.R.D. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 927.
391. E.g., Heckler, 747 F.2d at 591 (commanding the Secretary "to promulgate regulations [that]
will enable her to be informed as to whether the nursing facilities receiving federal Medicaid funds are
actually providing high quality medical care"); Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 936 (ordering the Commissioner
to submit a plan to the court that will redress the disparate impact of minority Medicaid patients).
392. See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and
Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 189, 205 (2001) (describing both the
cost and time involved for plaintiffs in class action lawsuits). Pursuing a class action will not improve
the quality of care provided to private-pay, elderly African Americans residing in nursing homes not
participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs. However, it will provide assistance to some of the
most vulnerable, elderly, indigent African Americans.
393. 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
394. Id. (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430-32
(1987)).
395. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
396. Id. at 283 (requiring unambiguous rights, not vague benefits or interests).
397. Id. at 284; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341.
398. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341; see also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284-86 ("[Where the text and
structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is
no basis for a private suit .... "). Although this appears to create another hurdle for private parties, in
1997 the Supreme Court noted that it has only twice found that an administrative scheme was sufficient
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refined Blessing test to the Medicaid Act's "reasonable promptness" provision and
the NHRA's requirements for nursing homes, the court should find that the
plaintiffs have a right to sue under § 1983.
The requirements of the Medicaid Act's "reasonable promptness" provision
are specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) and (10). They require states to fumish all
Medicaid patients with medical assistance, such as nursing home services for the
elderly, 399 with "reasonable promptness."4w Six circuits have already ruled that the
"reasonable promptness" provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) and (10) provide a
private right of action.4
For instance, in Doe v. Kidd,4 °2 the court held that an individual with
developmental disabilities could sue South Carolina for the state's failure to
provide temporary residential habilitation services approved in her plan of care
with "reasonable promptness. ' 40 3 The court ruled that the "reasonable promptness"
provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) was phrased in terms of the individuals
benefited, that the language specifically focuses on the individuals benefited, and
that the provision evidenced a clear intent by Congress to create a federal right.4°
Additionally, the court found that the "reasonable promptness" provision was clear
and explicit that nursing home services had to be provided and was worded in
to supplant claims under § 1983. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)). In
Middlesex, the Court noted that private parties had the right to seek federal review under the
administrative scheme, thus no private right of action was necessary under § 1983. 453 U.S. at 13-14. In
Smith, the Court held that "Congress intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a
plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed special education." 468 U.S. at
1009, superseded by statute, Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-372, 100 Stat.
796, as recognized in Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 805 F.2d 1222,
1224 (5th Cir. 1986). Some federal courts often ignore this requirement in their analysis of § 1983 or
summarily dismiss the requirement. See Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 523 (1990) (noting that the existence of state administrative
procedures ordinarily does not prevent a § 1983 claim)); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d
180, 193 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhere is a substantial burden on a state seeking to establish that Congress
has provided a comprehensive remedial scheme with which individual actions cannot be reconciled.");
Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 51-56 (tst Cir. 2003) (analyzing whether the NHRA created a private
right of action enforceable under § 1983 without discussing whether the statute's administrative scheme
is compatible with enforcement under § 1983).
399. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(D), 1396d(a) (2006) (detailing the requirements of state plans for
medical assistance, including nursing facilities for the elderly). If a Medicaid patient does not receive
nursing home care in a reasonably prompt manner, the patient has the opportunity to have a fair hearing
before the state agency. Id. § 1396a(a)(3).
400. Id. § 1396a(a)(8).
401. See cases cited supra note 51.
402. 501 F.3d 348 (2007).
403. Id. at 351, 356.
404. Id. at 356. The court noted that reasonable promptness in terms of a determination of eligibility
to receive services was forty-five or ninety days, depending on the applicant. Id. This time length,
however, applies to determination of eligibility, not actual access to services. Id. The time length that
constitutes reasonable promptness in accessing services has not been defined.
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"mandatory rather than precatory terms . ". .. 4 Finally, the court held that "the
Medicaid Act does not explicitly forbid recourse to § 1983" and that the
administrative rights granted in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) were not incompatible
with individual actions under § 1983.406 Based on Kidd and the rulings by five
other circuits, it is clear that the "reasonable promptness" provision found in 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) and (10) meet the requirements of the refined Blessing test.
Therefore, African Americans suing states and the Secretary for failure to provide
nursing home care in a reasonably prompt manner should not have any problem
showing that they have a private right under § 1983.
The relevant NHRA requirements are found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1), (b),
(f)(1), and (g)(1)(A). Sections 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1) and (b) require a nursing
home to "care for its residents in such a manner and in such an environment as will
promote maintenance or enhancement of the quality of life of each resident" and
"provide services and activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable
physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being or each resident .... ,'07 Sections 42
U.S.C. § 1396r(f)(1) and (g)(1)(A) require the Secretary and the states to ensure
that nursing homes are complying with 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1) and (b). There have
only been four opinions issued after the Gonzaga case regarding the NHRA and §
1983. Courts in three of the cases found a private right of action, while the third
court summarily dismissed the private right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without
applying Blessing or Gonzaga.40 8 The case that is germane to African Americans'
claims concerning quality of care violations in nursing homes is Grammer v. John
J. Kane Regional Centers-Glen Hazel40 9 because it analyzes 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)
of the NHRA.
In Grammer, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the NHRA
provided a private right of action under § 1983.410 The daughter of a woman who
died in a nursing home brought an action against a nursing home operated by the
county for wrongful death.411 The suit alleged that the nursing home failed to
provide quality nursing home care as required by the NHRA and thus caused the
resident's death.4t2 The court found that Grammer's mother was an intended
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(b)(l)(A), (b)(2) (2006).
408. Compare Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 299-303 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that
§ 1396r(e)(7) provided a private right of action under § 1983), and Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42,
51-56 (Ist Cir. 2003) (ruling that several sections of NHRA, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b), provide a
private right of action under § 1983), with Sparr v. Berks County, No. CIV.A. 02-2576, 2002 WL
1608243, at "1-*3 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2002) (summarily finding no private right of action under § 1396r
without applying the Blessing or Gonzaga factors).
409. 570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2009).
410. Id. at 532.
411. Id. at 522.
412. Id.
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beneficiary of the NHRA because she was a Medicaid recipient and a nursing home
resident, satisfying the first Blessing factor.41 3 Relying on an opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit,4 14 the court reasoned that although the language
is couched in terms of the duties of the nursing home, the intended beneficiaries of
the services were Medicaid beneficiaries.4 15 The court also ruled that the second
and third Blessing factors were met.4 16 According to the court, the rights language
was clearly delineated with must provide and must maintain, and the repeated use
of must unambiguously binds the states and nursing homes.417
Additionally, the court ruled that the 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b) of the NHRA
contained explicit rights creating language, the last requirement in the refined
Blessing test.48 Relying on prior decisions regarding the NHRA, 41 9 the court found
that the language was mandatory and the provisions were clearly "phrased in terms
of the persons benefitted.,A2° Although the section is phrased in terms of state and
nursing home responsibilities, the statute is "concerned with 'whether the needs of
any particular person have been satisfied,' not solely with an aggregate institutional
policy and practice. 421 Moreover, "Congress explicitly included the word 'rights'
[in the NHRA] when identifying the . . . entitlements of nursing home residents,
compared to other sections of the Medicaid Act, such as the "reasonable
422promptness" provision.
Finally, the court reviewed the structure of the statute to determine whether it
contained rights-creating language. The court reviewed the structural elements of
the Medicaid Act, which "speak in terms of an 'agreement between Congress and a
particular state.'"423 Applying a balancing test between the strength of the specific
language of the statutory provisions at issue and the larger structural elements of
the statute that the court had previously created, it found that the structure could not
neutralize the rights-creating language.424 Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he
413. Id. at 527.
414. Id. (citing Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. Inc. v. Whalen, 249 F.3d 136, 143-44 (2d Cir.
2001) (ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (NHRA) does not provide nursing homes a private right of action
under § 1983)).
415. Grammer, 570 F.3d at 527.
416. Id. at 528.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 531.
419. See id. at 529 (citing Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004)
(ruling that the Medicaid Act's reasonable promptness provision conferred a private right of action
under § 1983)).
420. Id. at 529-30.
421. Id. at 530 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)).
422. Id. at 531.
423. Id. (quoting Sabree, 367 F.3d at 191).
424. Id. at 531-32. The court created this balancing test in Sabree, in which the court ruled that the
reasonable promptness provision conferred a private right of action under § 1983. See Sabree, 367 F.3d
at 192-94.
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language used throughout the [NHRA] is explicitly and unambiguously rights-
creating, despite the countervailing elements of the statute. The larger statutory
structure, therefore, does not neutralize the rights-creating language contained
throughout the [NHRA].' 425
In the proposed case by African Americans, the class should rely on the
Grammer ruling to support a claim of a private right of action under § 1983. The
Secretary and the states will be unable to rebut this presumption because the
remedial scheme to address instances of quality of care violations is limited and
does not supplant § 1983. More specifically, the NHRA administrative scheme
does not provide remedies for Medicaid patients.426 Furthermore, when compared
to one of the only cases in which the Supreme Court ruled that the state rebutted the
presumption of the private right of action under § 1983, Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority. v. National Sea Clammers Ass 'n,427 the remedial scheme in the
NHRA is almost non-existent and does not constitute a comprehensive remedial
scheme.
In Middlesex County, the Supreme Court ruled that the remedial scheme was
comprehensive evidencing of Congressional intent to foreclose a private right of
action under § 1983.428 The remedial scheme in Middlesex County contained
unusually elaborate enforcement provisions, granting private individuals the right
to seek judicial review for complaints against the federal government and to seek
injunctions to enforce the statutes in the United States Courts of Appeals.429 Unlike
the scheme in Middlesex County, Medicaid patients have no right to remedies under
the NHRA. 430 Thus, based on the rulings in Grammer and Middlesex County,
African Americans should be able to sue the Secretary and the states for violations
of the NHRA's requirements of nursing homes.
B. Merits of the Medicaid Case
The federal and state governments jointly fund and regulate health care
entities, such as nursing homes, under the Medicaid Act. The Secretary implements
regulations governing the Medicaid Act, while each state submits detailed plans to
the secretary for approval and funding.43' Every state's plan is different; however,
425. Grammer, 570 F.3d at 532.
426. Id. at 532. Patients can only send complaints to the state alleging NHRA violations, which the
state then investigates. 42 C.F.R. § 488.332 (2009). However, there are no remedies available when the
state fails to address violations by nursing homes. See id. §§ 488.320, .335 (stating that the state is
responsible for investigating complaints, but giving no redress for individual grievances or inadequate
state survey performance).
427. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
428. Id. at 18-21.
429. Id. at 13-14.
430. Grammer, 570 F.3d at 525 n.2.
431. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).
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every state plan must include provisions granting Medicaid patients reasonably
prompt access to medical assistance.432 This access includes reasonably prompt
admission to nursing homes that provide nursing and rehabilitative services to the
indigent elderly.433 If the state is not providing reasonably prompt access, the
Secretary has a duty to sanction the state based on its look-behind authority.
1. Reasonable Promptness
Many courts have presumed that reasonably prompt access to "medical
assistance" includes provision of services that a state is obligated to provide,434
while other courts have limited it to adequate financial support.435 The Supreme
Court has not ruled on this distinction. Therefore, to succeed on the merits of the
case, African Americans either need to submit the claim to circuits that have ruled
the "reasonable promptness" provision requires the state to provide services or link
the failure to access nursing home services to the failure of the state to provide
adequate financial payments. Plaintiffs in Linton successfully provided evidence of
both.
In Linton, elderly African Americans brought lawsuits charging that
Tennessee's Medicaid bed certification policies violated the "reasonable
promptness" provision of Medicaid.436 Specifically, they asserted that the states'
policies for Medicaid bed certification allowed nursing homes to deny Medicaid
patients' admission because the nursing home did not have any Medicaid beds, but
if a more desirable Medicaid patient sought admission then another Medicaid bed
would be certified.437 Some patients were delayed for over a year.438 This was
432. Id. § 1396a(a)(8).
433. See id. § 1396a(a)(10) (including nursing facilities as a type of "medical assistance" required by
state plans).
434. See, e.g., S.D. ex reL Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 597 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e conclude that
[the state Medicaid agency] violated the Medicaid Act by denying [the plaintiff] a service described in
§ 1396d(a) that is necessary for ameliorative purposes ...."); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 715 (11 th
Cir. 1998) ("The plain language of the provision's reasonable promptness clause is clearly intended to
benefit Medicaid-'eligible individuals'....").
435. E.g., Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
Medicaid requires states to provide eligible recipients with "a prompt determination of eligibility and a
prompt payment" to obtain medical services); Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d
906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Clark v. Richman, 339 F. Supp. 2d 631, 642 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (same);
Sanders ex rel. Rayl v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1250 (D. Kan. 2004)
(same).
436. Linton ex ret. Arnold v. Comm'r of Health & Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925, 927-28 (M.D. Tenn.
1990).
437. Id. at 928.
438. See id. (stating that the plaintiff was diagnosed as requiring nursing home treatment in July
1987, but was still delayed a bed in December 1989).
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evidence that the patients were not provided reasonably prompt access to
services.
439
Moreover, plaintiffs showed that Tennessee's financial support caused this
delay in reasonably prompt access.440 As a way to decrease the money paid to
nursing homes, Tennessee granted nursing homes total discretion in the
certification of beds for use by Medicaid patients. 44 Some nursing homes used this
discretion to deny African American Medicaid patients admission because the
nursing home did not have any Medicaid beds."2 If, however, a Caucasian
Medicaid patient sought admission, the nursing home would certify another bed for
Medicaid use." 3 The court ruled for the plaintiffs holding that Tennessee's fiscal
policy violated Medicaid's "reasonable promptness" provision because it delayed
4
reasonably prompt access to medically necessary services.
As in Linton, empirical data provided in Part I shows that states have again
violated the "reasonable promptness" provision of the Medicaid Act.445 African
Americans are consistently delayed and denied reasonably prompt access to
medically necessary nursing home services because nursing homes deny admission
to African Americans. 46 Since the 1980s, several state studies have shown that
African Americans are delayed by at least ten days in a transfer from the hospital to
a nursing home. 4 7 This should satisfy courts that require proof that states have
failed to provide actual access to nursing home care.
439. See id. at 932-33, 936 (finding that Tennessee's limited bed policy for Medicaid patients has
resulted in many patients being unable to obtain "proper nursing home care" entitled under the statute).
440. See id. at 931-32 (explaining that, although Medicaid law mandates that states set Medicaid
payments at levels that will meet the costs necessary to adequately operate facilities, Tennessee's bed
certification program permitted nursing home operators to prefer private-pay patients that pay higher
rates than Medicaid patients).
441. Id.
442. Id. at 932 ("Because of the higher incidence of poverty in the [African American] population,
and the concomitant increased dependence on Medicaid, a policy limiting the amount of nursing home
beds available to Medicaid patients will disproportionately affect [African Americans].").
443. See generally id. ("[S]uch discrimination has caused a 'dual system' of long term care for the
frail elderly: a statewide system of licensed nursing homes, [seventy] percent funded by the Medicaid
program, serves [Caucasians]; while [African Americans] are relegated to substandard boarding homes
[that] receive no Medicaid subsidies.").
444. Id. at 936. Coupled with their "reasonable promptness" argument, plaintiffs also submitted a
claim for racial discrimination under Title VI on the basis of statewide data that indicated that "while
[African Americans] comprise 39.4 percent of the Medicaid population [in Tennessee in 1987], they
account for only 15.4 percent of those Medicaid patients who have been able to gain access to Medicaid-
covered nursing home services." Id. at 932.
445. See supra notes 436-44 and accompanying text (discussing claims and empirical evidence
presented in Linton); supra Part I (presenting empirical data on inequities in the promptness of treatment
received by racial minorities).
446. See Falcone & Broyles, supra note 6, at 591-92 (showing that non-Caucasian patients
experience much longer discharge delays than Caucasian patients, and suggesting discrimination as the
cause).
447. See supra note 84.
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These delays are a result of states' financial polices. Similar to the policies in
Linton, the current Medicaid policies of the states have failed to provide reasonably
prompt access to services. According to research studies, states, trying to keep
down the costs of Medicaid, grant nursing homes great discretion in their admission
practices and policies. 448 Thus in reality, the admissions decisions are left solely to
the nursing home staff, who deny African Americans admission to nursing homes
and deny African Americans reasonably prompt access to services.449 Arguably, the
state's failure to properly finance oversight of admissions policies at nursing homes
causes African Americans to be denied access to nursing home services. This
should satisfy courts that require proof that states have failed to provide adequate
financial support to fulfill the mandates of the "reasonable promptness" provision.
In order to prevail the plaintiffs must show that the delay was unreasonable.
These arguments would support a claim against the states, but not against the
Secretary. The substance of the case against the Secretary is found in the "look
behind" requirement.
2. Look-Behind Authority
The Medicaid Act authorizes the Secretary to fund state plans to provide
"health care to needy persons" through agreements with private and public persons
and institutions capable of providing such services.45 ° In order to receive Medicaid
funding, a state must submit a plan to the Secretary, which includes the method of
"establishing and maintaining health standards" for health care facilities that will
provide services to Medicaid recipients. 451 To ensure that the care provided is of
sufficient quality, the state must determine annually whether a participating nursing
home meets the requirements for continued participation in the program through
452the survey and certification process.
Congress granted the Secretary the authority to "look behind" the state's
determination of a nursing home's compliance with the state Medicaid plan.45 3
Based on the "look behind" provision, if the Secretary found that the state plan was
448. Grabowski, supra note 92, at 462 (noting that states regulate the admission process by
restricting the number of Medicaid certified nursing home beds).
449. See id. (identifying a positive correlation between increased nursing home admissions for
African Americans and increased Medicaid expenditures for states, resulting in less pressure from state
regulators to increase racial integration).
450. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980); Yearby, supra note 8, at 484.
451. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(6), (9)(A) (2006 & West Supp. 2009).
452. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.301, 488.308(a)-(b) (2009).
453. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(33)(B) (authorizing the Secretary to "make independent and binding
determinations concerning the extent to which individual institutions and agencies meet the
requirements for participation" if the Secretary has cause to question the adequacy of a state's
determination). This "look behind" provision was passed as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980, the same bill that created alternative sanctions to the termination of long-term care facilities. Pub.
L. No. 96-499, § 916, 94 Stat. 2599, 2623-24 (1980).
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deficient and the state failed to show that it had implemented an effective nursing
home inspection program, the Secretary has to reduce the percentage of federal
funds given to the state's Medicaid program.4 54 Thus, independent of the states'
mandate, the Secretary has an independent duty under Medicaid's "look behind"
provision to review the states plan and findings regarding Medicaid patients'
reasonably prompt access to nursing home care,4 5 according to the court's decision
in In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler.56
In Heckler, Medicaid patients residing in Colorado nursing homes brought a
class action suit4 57 against the Secretary. 458 The plaintiffs argued that the Medicaid
Act created an entitlement for Medicaid patients to receive quality care and that the
Secretary, therefore, has a duty to create a nursing home inspection system that
centered on the provision of quality nursing care.4 59 The Secretary argued that HHS
had fulfilled the requirements of Medicaid by publishing advisory enforcement
standards governing state inspection of Medicaid certified nursing homes.460 Each
sides' arguments centered on the duties of the Secretary under the Medicaid Act.
The Secretary argued that HHS fulfilled its duty by promulgating regulations
and developing forms to be used by the states to certify the compliance of nursing
homes. 46' However, according to the plaintiffs, these forms were deficient because
the forms only required states to review the physical appearance of the facility and
theoretical capability of a nursing home to render quality care, instead of regulating
the actual care provided to patients in nursing homes, which according to the
454. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g)(l).
455. See id. § 1396a(a)(33)(B) (codifying the grant of look-behind authority to the Secretary).
456. 747 F.2d 583, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1984).
457. See In re Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D. Colo. 1983) (establishing
the facts of the claim in Heckler). The Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
remedies for alleged violations of their constitutional right to be provided quality care in nursing homes
certified to participate in the Medicaid program. Id. The case was first filed on May 16, 1975, but did
not go to trial until May 17, 1982. Id. at 290, 292.
458. Id. at 290. The defendants of the suit included the Secretary, all the nursing home owners and
administrators of Medicaid certified nursing homes in Colorado, and the officers of the Colorado
Department of Social Services and the Colorado Department of Health. Id. The only defendant that
remained at the time of trial was the Secretary. Id. at 292. The State officials were dropped from the suit
in exchange for their stipulation that the State would file a complaint against the Secretary seeking a
revision of the Medicaid nursing home enforcement system. Id. at 291. Pursuant to the stipulation of
dismissal, the Colorado Attorney General filed a suit against the Secretary seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief for the Secretary's alleged failure to fulfill the mandate of the Social Security Act of
1935 by not effectively regulating Medicaid nursing homes. Id. at 290-9 1.
459. Id. at 293-94 (noting that, although the states administer the Medicaid program, the plaintiffs
argued that the Secretary had a duty to regulate Colorado's Medicaid plan based on the powers Congress
granted the Secretary under Medicaid).
460. See id. at 295 (discussing the issue of whether HHS's published forms were sufficient under the
law).
461. HHS provided the states with Form SSA-1569 to certify the compliance of nursing home's with
the Medicaid requirements. Id.
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462Medicaid recipients violated the "look behind" provision. Agreeing with the
Secretary, the court ruled that HI-S had fulfilled the requirements of the Medicaid
Act by promulgating regulations and providing forms to the states, reasoning that
the duty to ensure that the residents of nursing homes received quality care was up
463to the Colorado Department of Health through its licensure powers.
In 1984, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit.464 Reversing the district court's decision, the court ruled that
the Secretary had violated the plaintiffs' statutory rights by failing to regulate the
quality of nursing home care provided patients. 465 Because the purpose of the
Medicaid Act was to provide high quality medical care to needy persons, the court
reasoned that the Secretary must "promulgate regulations that allow the Secretary
to remain informed, on a continuing basis, as to whether facilities receiving federal
money are meeting the requirements of the Act" and to insure that the facilities are
providing high quality patient care.466 Providing this high quality care was an
ongoing requirement; therefore, the Secretary has a duty of continued supervision
of a nursing home rather than just initial knowledge of a nursing home's capability
to provide high quality patient care.
The court further reviewed the legislative history of the "look behind"
provision and found that even though the Medicaid Act requires each state to
develop specific medical standards and actually conduct the certification and
recertification nursing home inspections, the Medicaid Act does not absolve the
Secretary of the overall responsibility that the states and their nursing homes
comply. 467 The court based this decision on several duties in the Medicaid Act that
were granted solely to the Secretary, not the states. First, the Secretary, not the
states, actually determined whether facilities are approved for Medicaid
participation. 4 68 Second, to receive federal funds states agreed to comply with
federal statutory requirements of Medicaid.469 Third, each state's inspection plan
was approved or denied by the Secretary.470 Fourth, the states utilized federal
forms, procedures, and methods during their inspections.47' Each of these steps
required the Secretary to ensure that federal dollars were not being spent on mere
462. In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 588 (10th Cir. 1984). In fact, out of the 541
questions contained in the form, only thirty were related to patient care or required actual patient
observation. Id.; see also O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 295 (noting the plaintiffs' allegation that Form
SSA-1569 was defective because it was "facility-oriented" instead of "patient-oriented").
463. O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 296-97.
464. Heckler, 747 F.2d at 583, 585.
465. Id. at 590-91.
466. Id. at 590.
467. Id. at 589-90.
468. Id. at 589.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
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paper compliance by the states or an individual nursing home; rather, the key to the
regulation was that the patients actually received quality care.472
Consequently, the court ruled that, by granting the Secretary the look-behind
authority, Congress mandated the Secretary to make an independent determination
of whether a Medicaid certified nursing home actually meets the requirements of
Medicaid irrespective of the state's findings when the Secretary had cause.47 3 Cause
included complaints made to the Secretary by the residents, advocates, or others
about the quality of care or condition of the facility. 474 Because the residents in
Heckler had complained to the Secretary about the quality of care and the Secretary
failed to use his authority under the "look behind" provision, the court remanded
the case back to the district court and ordered the court to compel the Secretary to
revise and implement new Medicaid regulations that focused on the quality of care
furnished to Medicaid recipients in nursing homes.
475
Applying the standard in Heckler, African Americans should prevail against
the Secretary. African Americans are consistently denied reasonably prompt access
to medically necessary nursing home services because nursing homes deny African
Americans admission. This empirical data consistently demonstrates that for the
last two decades elderly African Americans have been and remain subject to delays
in transfer and denial of admission to quality nursing home care in spite of state
nursing home plans. As in Heckler, the Secretary has cause to sanction the states
because many Title VI complaints and research studies have noted states' failure to
provide African Americans with reasonably prompt access to nursing home care.
To date, the Secretary has not decreased Medicaid payments to states that fail to
adequately discipline these nursing homes. Hence, the court should find that the
Secretary has violated the "look behind" provision.
472. Id. at 589-90.
473. Id. at 590; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-1479, at 140-41 (1980) ("The conference
agreement included . . . a modification limiting the Secretary's authority to 'look behind' a State's
survey . . . to situations in which the Secretary has cause to question the adequacy of the State's
determination.").
474. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1479, at 141.
475. Heckler, 747 F.2d at 591-92. On April 29, 1985, the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado ordered the Secretary to promulgate new regulations consistent with the Court of
Appeals mandate. In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 622 F. Supp. 403, 404 (D. Colo. 1985).
Nevertheless, the Secretary failed to meet all the objectives of the order and was ordered to revise its
regulations and finally found in contempt of the order in 1987. In re Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 656 F.
Supp. 1093, 1099 (D. Colo. 1987). After repeated failures, the Secretary was finally found in contempt
of the order in 1987. In re Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Colo. 1987). In 1988,
the Secretary submitted the passage of the NHRA as means of compliance, but the court ruled that,
"[t]he passage of the OBRA [of 1987] in no way modifies or preempts the Tenth Circuit's decision."
Smith v. Bowen, 1988 WL 235574, at *1 (D. Colo. Frb. 18, 1988). In June, the Secretary finally enacted
regulations in compliance with the court's order, amending both the Medicaid and Medicare regulations.
Medicare and Medicaid; Long-Term Care Survey, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,850, 22,850-01 (June 17, 1988)
(codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 442, 488).
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C. Merits of the NHRA Case
Under the NHRA, nursing homes are required to "care for its residents in
such a manner and in such an environment as will promote maintenance or
enhancement of the quality of life of each resident" and "provide services and
activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and
psychosocial well-being of each resident .... The NHRA requires at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r(f)(1) and (g)(1)(A) that the states and Secretary ensure that nursing homes
provide residents with quality care.477
Empirical data consistently demonstrates that for the last two decades elderly
African Americans have been and remain subject to poor quality nursing home care
in spite of state nursing home enforcement programs. 478 Discussed in detail in Part
I.C, African Americans are more likely to suffer late-stage pressure sores and be
hospitalized.479 Furthermore, the facilities in which African Americans reside
provide worse care than facilities in which Caucasians live. 480 African Americans
reside in nursing homes "with lower ratings of cleanliness/maintenance and
lighting .... ,,48 Yet, the states have not increased the discipline of these nursing
homes that provide substandard quality of care to African Americans, nor has the
Secretary decreased Medicaid payments to states that fail to adequately discipline
these nursing homes.482 Thus, the Secretary and the states are in violation of the
NHRA's requirements for nursing homes.
One weakness of the claims based on the NHRA's requirements for nursing
homes is that the Secretary and the states actively regulate the quality of care of
nursing home residents. The state and Secretary may cite the current survey and
certification system and argue that the state's plan and Secretary's review of the
states' plan is sufficient to provide quality care to Medicaid residents, fulfilling
their duty to nursing home residents. Moreover, the Secretary and the states may
submit that, although African Americans do not receive quality care, most
Medicaid patients residing in nursing homes receive quality care, which is all that
is required by the NHRA. The empirical evidence, however, does not support this
contention.
Instead, empirical research shows that nursing homes that primarily rely on
Medicaid provide poor quality of care compared to nursing homes that primarily
rely on private pay payments.483 The quality of care provided by some nursing
476. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(A), (2) (2006).
477. Id. §1396r(f)(1), (g)(1)(A).
478. See supra Part I.
479. Spinner, supra note 123.
480. See Mor et al., supra note 25, at 240 (discussing racial disparities in nursing home care).
481. Grabowski, supra note 92, at 456.
482. Yearby, supra note 8, at 486; see supra Part II.B.1-2.
483. Mor et al., supra note 25, at 227-28.
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homes whose primary source of payment is Medicaid is so poor that researchers
deemed these nursing homes as lower-tiered facilities.484 It is crucial to note that,
though African Americans and Caucasians reside in poor quality Medicaid nursing
homes, 485 African Americans are three to five times more likely to be in lower-
tiered facilities than Caucasians.486 These lower-tiered facilities have significant
Medicaid deficiencies, such as using physical restraints unnecessarily, and having
inadequate pain control and inappropriate use of antipsychotic medications,
487
which are not being rectified by the current regulations.4 8 Contrary to the Secretary
and the states' arguments, the current Medicaid nursing home enforcement system
is not up to the task of providing quality nursing home care, which
disproportionately affect African American residents.
Whether African Americans are successful on the merits depends on whether
courts are willing to eradicate the meaningless distinctions in reasonable
promptness between providing financing and providing services, and the difference
under the NHRA between right to services and right to quality services. The fact
that the Secretary and the states finance nursing home stays for Medicaid patients is
inconsequential if African Americans are consistently delayed transfer and denied
admission to quality nursing homes. Four decades after the enactment of Title VI,
the time has come to provide African Americans with reasonably prompt access to
quality nursing home care.
CONCLUSION
Minority patients are overrepresented in poorer quality nursing homes and
"[r]ecent research suggests that African Americans residing in nursing homes were
nearly four times as likely to reside in a home with limited resources and
historically poor performance than were [Caucasian] patients. 'A89 These racial
inequities persist in spite of the civil rights laws that require health care entities to
provide equal access to health care, regardless of race.490 Traditionally, individual
African Americans have used Title VI to try to rectify racial inequities, but these
484. Id. at 227.
485. See Grabowski, supra note 92, at 460 (reviewing race and socioeconomic status, and finding
that Medicaid and Medicare patients were admitted to poor quality facilities).
486. Mor et al., supra note 25, at 238 & fig.2. This ratio varies by state from zero to nine, and the
only state where the ratio is zero is Kentucky. Id. at 238 fig.2.
487. Cynthia Faye Barnett, Treatment Rights of Mentally Ill Nursing Home Residents, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 578, 596-97 (1978); Yearby, supra note 8, at 461-62.
488. See Mor et al., supra note 25, at 246 (noting that current regulations inadvertently perpetuate
lower-tier facilities' deficiencies in meeting patient needs).
489. Mary L. Fennell, Editorial, Racial Disparities in Care: Looking Beyond the Clinical Encounter,
40 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 1713, 1717 (2005), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC1361239/.
490. Yearby, supra note 8, at 445-46; see supra note 9.
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actions have failed to address racial discrimination because the government has not
adequately sanctioned perpetrators of racial discrimination.49
In 1980, the Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Mary
Frances Berry, noted that there was no absence of civil rights laws, merely an
absence of civil rights enforcement by the government.492 She suggested that the
civil rights community could fix the problem by suing the government and
inducing it to enforce Title VI in health care.493 Twenty-nine years later, the time
has come to put this suggestion into practice on a national level and take one step
further. One such strategy is to use the civil rights laws to induce HHS and the
states to fulfill their non-race-based regulatory duties as a way to re-invigorate civil
rights enforcement.494 This strategy is not just about forcing HHS and the states to
fulfill their regulatory mandates. It is also about transforming a broken civil rights
system that implicitly accepts the unequal treatment of elderly African Americans
into an effective system that enforces proscriptions against racial discrimination,
particularly in the nursing home industry.
491. See supra notes 51-52.
492. Ivie, supra note 48, at 35.
493. Id.
494. See supra Part II1.
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